Francione Totally Misinterprets Singer

Repeatedly in at least Rain without Thunder, Introduction to Animal Rights, his blog, internet forums, and he boasts also his latest book Animals as Persons Francione claims that Singer denies self-awareness and a sense of the future to farmed animals, and that Singer only objects to the manner of their killing rather than their actual killing since these animals could conceivably be "replaced" with equally happy animals. The replacement argument I will address in my book. Francione's above misinterpretation of Singer I will examine right now. Francione writes:

Singer maintains that animals—with the exception of chimpanzees, orangutans, and gorillas—are not self-aware and have neither a ‘continuous mental existence’ nor desires for the future. Animals have an interest in not suffering, but they have no interest in continuing to live or in not being regarded as the resources or property of humans. They do not care whether we raise and slaughter them for food or use them for experiments or exploit them as resources in any other way, as long as they lead a reasonably pleasant life. (Francione 2000, p. 136)

He adds, describing “…animals, most of whom are not self-aware, according to Singer.” (Ibid., p. 145) We find again: “…Singer maintains…animals are not self-aware…” (Ibid., p. 139) Francione makes it seem as though Singer rules out self-consciousness for farmed animals and so these animals should be treated as though they have no right to life. This is a complete falsification of the research record as to what Singer actually states, including in Practical Ethics, which Francione himself repeatedly cites. Francione also reports that Singer said a case can be made that other animals than gorillas are persons, but comes to no conclusion. (Ibid., 218) Francione is contradicting himself here. What is Singer saying, that he comes to the conclusion that animals are not self-aware as Francione usually writes? Or that Singer comes to no conclusion on the issue? It turns out that neither view is accurate. Singer does indeed come to a conclusion in no less than two distinct ways, and both are contrary to what Francione misinterprets.

So what does Singer truly say?

In Practical Ethics, Singer writes that the most dramatic evidence of self-consciousness in nonhuman animals is in apes using American Sign Language. (Singer 1993, p. 111) He notes that it may well turn out that whales and dolphins are both rational and self-conscious. (Ibid., p. 118)

Next Singer addresses whether dogs and cats are self-conscious. He finds that dogs evidently have a sense of the future. A guide dog took a human each Friday to places where they do the weekend shopping without being needed to be told the day, and feral cats also turn up on the right day of the week for feeding. (Ibid., p. 118) Singer concludes that claims to future-sense of dogs and cats is “plausible and in the absence of better studies they [everyday observations of this sort] should be taken seriously.” (Ibid., p. 119) Yet Singer is said not to grant that dogs have future desires by Francione. (Francione 2000, p. 140) He "disputes" Singer (a straw man argument), going on as follows: “If a dog were unable to anticipate the future,…” (Ibid.)

Singer then branches out in discussing farmed animals: “…if dogs and cats qualify as persons, the mammals we use for food cannot be far behind.” (Singer 1993, p. 119) He adds that if there is any doubt about whether an animal is a person, we should give that being “the benefit of the doubt.” (Ibid.) Specifically, Singer tells us:

...if it is wrong to kill a person when we can avoid doing so, and there is real doubt about whether a being we are thinking of killing is a person, we should give that being the benefit of the doubt. The rule here is the same as that among deer hunters: if you see something moving in the bushes and are not sure if it is a deer or a hunter, don't shoot! (We may think the human shouldn't shoot in either case, but the rule is a sound one within the ethical framework hunters use.) On these grounds, a great deal of the killing of non-human animals must be condemned. (Ibid.)

Singer is clearly finding here that we should give the benefit of the doubt that dogs, cats and farmed animals are persons (a topic he considers just before the above quotation), but also, earlier he said he finds it "plausible" that they are on the basis of the available evidence, and he himself therefore seems to have no overriding doubts. It is plausible enough to give the benefit of the doubt, or to overturn doubt practically. Note that for persons, Singer says we have an obligation not to kill them. He is unequivocal, killing farmed animals, which he was just talking about, "...must be condemned." This is a far cry indeed from Francione saying Singer has no problem with killing such animals, and is only concerned with their not suffering.

By contrast, it is uncontroversial that Singer calls fish impersonal beings without self-awareness (Dunayer well disputes this allegation about fishes elsewhere in her book Speciesism).

However, Singer reflects:

In the present state of our knowledge, this strong case against killing can be invoked most categorically against the slaughter of chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans. On the basis of what we now know about these near-relatives of ours, we should immediately extend to them the same full protection against being killed that we extend now to all human beings. A case can also be made, though with varying degrees of confidence, on behalf of whales, dolphins, monkeys, dogs, cats, pigs, seals, bears, cattle, sheep and so on, perhaps even to the point at which it may include all mammals—much depends on how far we are prepared to go in extending the benefit of the doubt where a doubt exists. (Singer 1993, p. 132)

Here he casts some doubt on the personhood of dogs, cats and cattle, but he is apparently talking about other peoples' doubts. For again, earlier he finds it most "plausible" to find cats and so cattle have a sense of the future as his own view and recommends extending the benefit of the doubt regardless. That is very far from denial, isn't it? Singer is indeed cautious here, typical of a theoretician and philosopher, but Francione confuses this with a flat-out denial that these animals are self-consciously aware of the future. Since Singer views it as plausible on the basis of evidence that animals are persons, as is clear from his writing (and that we should shore up our doubts—including those expressed in the above passage of course--by extending the benefit of the doubt), he must think this contributes to what he calls a “case against killing” these animals, as he writes in the above quotation.

Singer calls it a “questionable assumption” to assume that birds are not self-conscious, (Ibid., p. 133), implying that he tends to think that chickens are self-aware, and certainly that they must be extended the benefit of the doubt too, as he wrote on p. 119.

I am not saying that Francione is willfully misrepresenting Singer. Only that he offers an erroneous and not particularly competent reading. In summation, I have shown that Francione denies self-awareness and awareness of the future to, say, farmed animals on Singer's world view. I have also printed Singer’s actual view that:

1. he regards self-awareness and a sense of the future in cats and cattle as “plausible” based on evidence that he considers, implying the opposite idea is "implausible" since he cites no evidence for that denial but rather compelling evidence for the affirmation;
   
2. he suggests that anyone with doubts should extend these animals "the benefit of the doubt."

These are two theoretical routes, one epistemic and the other ethical, for affirming the opposite of the view that Francione mistakenly ascribes to Singer. Note that above, Francione concedes that a case can be made for farmed animal personhood, but that Singer comes to no conclusion. I have clearly shown he has relevantly concluded in two explicit ways.

To head off an anticipated objection, it is true, anyone who reads Animal Liberation and Practical Ethics closely will find that if it is a choice between lives, a sense of the future (along with self-awareness, etc.) is one of Singer's criteria for deciding whom to save. However, it would simply be a mistake to interpret this as Singer's view of normal practice.

Francione keeps waving his misinterpretation around like a stick. There is a difference between studying Singer and muddying Singer, and Francione has only done the latter. It is a pity no one called him on his inaccuracy sooner. It might have spared him a long record of embarrassment. People tend to regard these sorts of errors more strongly because they are more elementary and everyone can agree on them. But errors in logic are really no different and those sorts of points I have made ever so many times before.

Works Cited

Francione, Gary. 2000. Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Singer, Peter. 1993. Practical Ethics. Second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

FURTHER READING ON ANIMAL RIGHTS INCREMENTALISM

A Selection of Related Articles

Sztybel, David. "Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism". Journal for Critical Animal Studies 5 (1) (2007): 1-37.

go there

Short version of "Animal Rights Law".

go there

Sztybel, David. "Incrementalist Animal Law: Welcome to the Real World".

go there

Sztybel, David. "Sztybelian Pragmatism versus Francionist Pseudo-Pragmatism".

go there

A Selection of Related Blog Entries

Anti-Cruelty Laws and Non-Violent Approximation

Use Not Treatment: Francione’s Cracked Nutshell

Francione Flees Debate with Me Again, Runs into the “Animal Jury”

The False Dilemma: Veganizing versus Legalizing

Veganism as a Baseline for Animal Rights: Two Different Senses

Francione's Three Feeble Critiques of My Views

Startling Decline in Meat Consumption Proves Francionists Are Wrong Once Again!

The Greatness of the Great Ape Project under Attack!

Francione Totally Misinterprets Singer

Francione's Animal Rights Theory

Francione on Unnecessary Suffering

My Appearance on AR Zone

D-Day for Francionists

Sztybel versus Francione on Animals' Property Status

The Red Carpet

Playing into the Hands of Animal Exploiters

The Abolitionist ApproachES

Francione's Mighty Boomerang

Dr. David Sztybel Home Page

Francione Feebly Replies to Ingrid Newkirk (Part 2)

Although I have many urgent things to attend to, I feel the need to reply right away to Francione's erroneous replies to Ms. Newkirk. Francione was not satisfied with the letter he wrote to The Guardian’s online comments on Ms. Newkirk’s opinion piece (see my last blog entry). He reproduces a quote Ms. Newkirk cites from Singer, essentially saying that the animals would prefer to live not constantly crammed in, in chronic pain from hormone-driven growth that makes fat birds with horribly weak skeletons, and that birds would prefer not to be conscious when being scalded alive for feather removal. Singer ends his passage stating: “The answers should be clear.” Ironically, Francione adopts the latter phrase for the title of his latest blog entry for January 23, 2010 with his further reply to Ms. Newkirk.
I will faithfully report what Francione says, and then show that he still has not argued his way out of his troubles:

1. Francione writes:
   

   Would you prefer to get an ice cream cone before you were molested? Would you prefer not to be tortured before you were murdered? Would you prefer to be tortured for 15 minutes rather than 20 minutes before you were murdered? Would you prefer not to be beaten before you were raped? Would you prefer to be water boarded on a padded board rather than an unpadded board?
   

   The answers should be clear.
   

   Reply:
   

   The argument seems to be the following:
   

   1. It is preferable not to be beaten before being raped.
      
   2. However, we should call for an end to rape regardless of whether or not there is beating because we can simply ban the practice and because that is morally right.
      
   3. Analogously, it is preferable for chickens not to be scalded alive before being slaughtered.
      
   4. However, we should call for an end to chicken slaughter regardless of whether or not there is scalding of conscious chickens because we can simply ban the practice and because that is morally right.

   Let us now critically assess this argument. As for 1., everyone agrees it is wrong to rape and all animal rights people agree it is wrong for chickens to be routinely slaughtered for food. Furthermore, everyone agrees with 2. that we should call for a ban on rape simply, not for a law to make it more “humane.” It is indeed possible to get such a ban: what is actual is always possible.

   However, things start to go wrong with Francione in 3., because he assumes that calling for laws affecting humans and nonhumans are analogous. Let it be clear that Ms. Newkirk, myself, and our allies call for laws to end chicken slaughter as soon as possible. It is impossible to do better than that. Should it be argued that although we call for an end to chicken slaughter A.S.A.P., banning the conscious of scalding of chickens will delay the passing of animal rights laws? I addressed this last blog entry: briefly, we morally cannot keep having the chickens scalded for our own propaganda purposes, and it would be counterproductive anyway since a cruel culture is less conducive to animal rights than a kinder culture. So the animal rights pragmatists not only call for an end to “rape” (and what it is compared to), but we are more likely to win the ban sooner. Unless of course cruelty conduces towards animal rights.

   Furthermore, 3. assumes that we should call simply for a ban of rape and chicken slaughter because we can ban the practice. Animal rights pragmatists agree that is true for the long-term. That is why we call for the ban no less strongly than these other abolitionists. However, in the foreseeable short-term, we absolutely cannot ban the practice. Calling for an end to speciesist practices does not result in a ban anytime soon in the way that calling for laws against rape because of nonviolence among other factors would win—in fact we know that battle is already won. So straightforwardly, Francione poses a false analogy. If we cannot change the fact of chicken slaughter for the time being, unlike rape, we should make the best of the situation for the animals and this Francione fails to do. As Singer says, this should be clear.

2. Francione writes:
   

   Of course it is better to do less harm than more harm. But that begs the fundamental question as to whether we can justify imposing the harm in the first place. If rape is wrong, we should not have campaigns for “humane” rape. The same analysis applies to pedophilia, torture, murder, etc.
   

   Reply:
   

   Again, all animal rights parties agree rape and chicken slaughter is morally wrong and that we should campaign thusly. Just the fact that it is morally wrong does not logically entail that we should not advocate slaughter that is better for chickens if we use the best criterion of morality: what is best for animals at any given point in time? It is best they not be slaughtered at all, hence the long-term demand. For now, what is really best, or the best reality permits, includes not allowing scalding horrifyingly wakeful birds.
   
   
   

3. Francione writes:
   

   The thing that Newkirk does not bother to mention about Singer is that he does not think that eating animals or animal products is inherently problematic. Indeed, Singer has said repeatedly that because most animals do not have an interest in their lives, the problem is not that we use but how we use them. Singer thinks that being an omnivore is morally acceptable if you take care to eat animal flesh and products from animals who have been “humanely” raised and slaughtered. I have discussed this issue at length in my books (particularly Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation and my forthcoming book, The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition or Regulation?, to be published by Columbia University Press in April 2010) but you can read some essays on this subject here (See 1, 2, 3, 4).
   

   Newkirk, whose organization, according to Newsweek Magazine, kills approximately 85% of the animals it rescues, appears to agree that death is not per se a harm for animals. So for Singer and Newkirk, the issue is treatment, not use. But that is a fundamentally different way of analyzing the problem than what we would do were humans involved. And I would maintain that what accounts for the difference is nothing more than speciesism.
   

   Reply:
   

   Francione routinely and in dozens of places misinterprets Singer. He gets Singer utterly wrong on this point, and there is no evidence that PETA agrees with these statements that are falsely ascribed to Singer. I have known this for a long time but I will prove what Singer actually says in my next blog entry since I think this urgently needs to be aired on this occasion for debate. Singer could have done this himself, but for whatever reason(s) has not.
   
   
   

4. Francione writes:
   

   Most of us claim to believe that it is morally wrong to inflict “unnecessary” suffering and death on animals. Whatever else “necessity” means, it must mean that we cannot justify inflicting suffering and death on animals for reasons of pleasure, amusement, or convenience. That we believe this was demonstrated in a compelling way in the outcry over Michael Vick’s dogfighting situation.
   

   Reply:
   

   I agree an animal rights understanding of “unnecessary suffering” forbids using animals as we do. However, Francione, reflecting his seeming inability to admit that he is wrong, does not acknowledge that speciesists have a different sense of “unnecessary suffering” that does not logically imply anything other than speciesism. See my blog entry (3) for July 28, 2007 where I totally nail down this logical point.
   
   
   

5. Francione writes:
   

   So why don’t we re-conceptualize the question and ask: is it better to torture sentient beings a tiny bit less or to eat foods that do not involve any suffering or death and that are better for our bodies and the planet?
   

   Reply:
   

   Torture them a tiny bit less? He will seemingly never cease to rely on distortion. Would it be a “tiny” matter even in his life if someone aggressively and violently hooked him upside down by the feet and then ran him fully conscious through a tank of boiling-hot water to “de-hair” him? Would it be a “tiny” indignity for him to be force to live crammed shoulder-to-shoulder all his life, never to move freely or even relieve himself with dignity? Would it be puny and insignificant for him to be fed growth hormones to grow obese with only a tiny junior skeleton to support all that weight, resulting in constant agony? Unpleasant things of tiny significance happen to us each day. Is Francione saying he undergoes equivalent sorts of experiences as those listed above ordinarily? These treatments amount to hugely more significant torture for the animals and would also be terrifically significant for Francione or any other human who went through analogous suffering. As for these animals’ sufferings to Francione, they are explicitly of “tiny” significance. Frankly, that is disgusting because atrocious. Perhaps it is even a speciesist estimation since we would never so call comparable treatments of humans.
   

   In any case, it is a further indication of just how out-of-touch with reality Francione is with regard to the significance of "welfarist" reforms that he thinks of it solely in terms of eliminating tortures in whatever degrees. In Sweden, pigs by law have plenty of room (including greater stall space), straw bedding, time outdoors, and toys for mental stimulation. These enhancements (which are also hugely significant to animals, by the way, even as is basic quality of life for humans) promote positive well-being, not anything to do with "torture." The absence of these measures is not especially torturous, but it is that much worse for animals.
   
   
   
   
   
   

6. Francione writes:
   

   Does Newkirk really think that the slaughter of 56 billion animals per year (not counting fish) is an occasion for evoking a “smile”?
   

   Reply:
   

   It is likewise obscene to portray Ms. Newkirk as smiling at animal suffering and death when she had thousands of times more effect than Francione in mitigating these factors. As for her celebrating her hard-won progress for animals? Let her. She deserves that. But to say she smiles at all of speciesism? Revolting.
   
   
   

7. Francione writes:
   

   The answer should be clear.
   

   Reply:
   

   Yes, and it should not be distorted by false analogies, misinterpretations of prominent scholars, equivocation on the meaning of “unnecessary suffering,” and obscene distortions that the insults of factory farming, etc. are “tiny” and that Ms. Newkirk smiles at animal slaughter and encourages the same in others.

Other false points Francione makes are repetitive, e.g., that welfare laws only make animal exploitation more profitable (but see my last blog entry). Whenever he argues something, even before reading it, by now I always ask myself, "So what's he done wrong this time?" And I always find it. That is mainly because for some reason, he seems to have trouble learning to correct his mistakes. As a result, these errors endlessly repeat like broken records in his thoughts and writings.

FURTHER READING ON ANIMAL RIGHTS INCREMENTALISM

A Selection of Related Articles

Sztybel, David. "Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism". Journal for Critical Animal Studies 5 (1) (2007): 1-37.

go there

Short version of "Animal Rights Law".

go there

Sztybel, David. "Incrementalist Animal Law: Welcome to the Real World".

go there

Sztybel, David. "Sztybelian Pragmatism versus Francionist Pseudo-Pragmatism".

go there

A Selection of Related Blog Entries

Anti-Cruelty Laws and Non-Violent Approximation

Use Not Treatment: Francione’s Cracked Nutshell

Francione Flees Debate with Me Again, Runs into the “Animal Jury”

The False Dilemma: Veganizing versus Legalizing

Veganism as a Baseline for Animal Rights: Two Different Senses

Francione's Three Feeble Critiques of My Views

Startling Decline in Meat Consumption Proves Francionists Are Wrong Once Again!

The Greatness of the Great Ape Project under Attack!

Francione Totally Misinterprets Singer

Francione's Animal Rights Theory

Francione on Unnecessary Suffering

My Appearance on AR Zone

D-Day for Francionists

Sztybel versus Francione on Animals' Property Status

The Red Carpet

Playing into the Hands of Animal Exploiters

The Abolitionist ApproachES

Francione's Mighty Boomerang

Dr. David Sztybel Home Page

Francione Feebly Replies to Ingrid Newkirk

I digress from the Animal Ethics series once again to address breaking news of how Francione responds to Newkirk's animal rights pragmatism concerning legislative changes.

This past Friday, Ingrid Newkirk published an impassioned opinion piece in The Guardian, a world-famous U.K. newspaper. Her article can be read by clicking here. Gary Francione had the nerve to post an unfailingly dull reply which I will now thoroughly debunk. Many who have read my essay
"Animal Rights Law" or the shortened version of it (elsewhere on my site) and my earlier blog entries have seen that Francione's attempts at arguing are troubled to say the least. At least he is consistent in this respect.

His letter focuses on chicken slaughter. In the old slaughter method, the birds would be stunned only some of the time but it was well documented that many of them remain conscious and struggling when their bodies are dipped in a scalding tank to remove their feathers. And then their throats are cut while conscious too, which is not an instant or painless death solution either. They have nerves in their throats for one thing. Controlled atmosphere killing stuns them all and prevents this gross suffering.

I will now entirely refute each of his replies to Ms. Newkirk:

1. Francione writes:
   

   "Ingrid Newkirk mistakenly assumes incremental welfare reforms will lead to the abolition of animal use. That assumption is without foundation."
   

   To this I reply:
   

   No one including of course Ms. Newkirk argues that such reforms cause animals to have rights and thus not to be considered property. That is a straw man argument that Francione relentlessly (to use a polite term) uses. However, welfare reforms unmistakably lead towards a kinder culture. Leaving the chickens to be scalded alive leads towards a more cruel culture. It is unintelligible to say that a more cruel culture will be more receptive to animal rights than a kinder one, since kind people are more receptive to recognizing and respecting the interests of animals. Furthermore, it is worth helping these chickens and so many others in innumerable ways even if it does not lead to the liberation of other animals in the future in some measurable way. The animals suffering now matter, though evidently not to Francione. He does not even refer to the suffering that is spared, let alone care about it. I have made these points before in a studious attention to reality and how it works, but Francione has studiously ignored them and hence also the realities in question.
   
   
   

2. Francione writes:
   

   "...the animal welfare reforms that are accepted are, for the most part, those that increase production efficiency. It is interesting to note (as Victor Schonfeld did) that PETA's own campaign for the controlled-atmosphere killing of poultry emphasizes that this method of slaughter is economically beneficial for producers. Such reforms do not move animals away from the property paradigm; they enmesh animals more deeply in that paradigm."
   

   To this I reply:
   

   Francione and his followers show no concern here for the preventable suffering of chickens outlined above. It is monstrously callous not to be concerned to spare these animals this suffering of scalding and literal cut-throat treatment when such reforms can be done and have been done, no thanks to the Francione fanatics. Indeed, Francione associates property status with the disregard of animals' interests, including unnecessary suffering. Ending chicken-slaughter-cruelty for example therefore undermines animals' property status as Francione describes it by attending to animals' interests to some degree (actually he is not receptive to attending to animal interests in degrees, dealing instead in unrealistic whole-interest protection--see my essay).
   
   
   
   

3. Francione writes:
   

   "...welfare reform makes the public more comfortable about animal exploitation. The emerging "happy" meat/animal products movement is compelling evidence of this phenomenon."
   

   To this I reply:
   

   I agree that animals slaughtered does not constitute "happy meat." However the chicken reform mentioned above can be progressive regardless of such linguistic distortions. Furthermore, the public should be more comfortable with animal treatment if our fellow creatures are not being tortured as much. If animals are more "comfortable" (more accurately: spared a form of torture which I described above) we who are more compassionate should feel more comfortable. Francione should not keep the chickens conscious and scalded/throat-cut just to avoid public complacency! That is using animals as a means to an end in his perverse form of campaigning. To be clear, these reforms do not make the public complacent that animal rights is wrong or not fitting to adopt because such reforms are not about animal rights, and the general public knows that. No one is so stupid as to think that sparing chickens agony discredits animal rights or makes it any less applicable, and if anyone is so intellectually limited, they are of no concern to anyone in my camp at least.
   
   
   

4. Francione writes:
   

   "...we have had animal welfare reform for more than 200 years now and it has not led to the abolition of any form of institutionalized exploitation. Indeed, we are using more animals in more horrific ways than at any time in humane [sic] history."
   

   To this I reply:
   

   We have not had welfare reform coupled with animal rights for long at all. Suffering-reduction has occurred. The lack of victory for animal rights law can be turned around at Francione’s own approach. He does not seem to notice when his critiques of others apply to his own position. In any case, the animal liberation movement is also steadily growing, in contrariety to what Francione implies. I write in detail about this in my blog entry (28) June 26/08.
   
   
   

5. Francione writes:
   

   "PETA is an organization that gives awards to the sellers of animal flesh and other products (Whole Foods Markets) and to slaughterhouse designers (Temple Grandin). Newsweek reports that PETA has killed 85% of the animals it has "rescued." (That fact alone should lead anyone who regards animals as having moral value to disavow PETA.) And PETA relentlessly uses sexism and misogyny in its campaigns."
   

   To this I reply:
   

   PETA recognizes progress where it has been made. Progress should be celebrated. PETA does not hate women and has naked men as well in “I’d rather go naked than wear fur,” as well as people of different body sizes. I do not agree with PETA's killing animals as that contravenes the right to life. But that has nothing to do with the appropriateness of chicken slaughter techniques, so let us not confuse the issues, please.
   
   
   

6. Francione writes:
   

   "Newkirk is wrong to say that the only alternative to welfare reform, which is ineffective at best and is counterproductive, is violent revolution. On the contrary, it is only a rejection of violence that is ever going to change anything."
   

   To this I reply:
   

   Francione does not show welfare reform is ineffective. He is just unconcerned about the suffering-reduction in the example he himself uses. He does not consider it "effective" or "productive” to relieve suffering. That is not an effect he is concerned to "produce." Also, not being violent to animals is not enough at all. It is an oversimplistic approach as usual for Francione (see other of my blog entries for example). Animals need to be well cared for with benefits on sanctuaries.
   
   
   

7. Francione concludes:
   

   Thank you for your consideration of my comments. (He tediously writes this at the end of all his postings in reply to others on this thread.)
   

   And I say: Sure, any time!

I have addressed all of his points of reply to Ms. Newkirk. The fundamentalists can always be refuted, because their position is apparently always rooted in falsehood, logical fallacy, short-sightedness, ignoring refutations, and callousness.

FURTHER READING ON ANIMAL RIGHTS INCREMENTALISM

A Selection of Related Articles

Sztybel, David. "Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism". Journal for Critical Animal Studies 5 (1) (2007): 1-37.

go there

Short version of "Animal Rights Law".

go there

Sztybel, David. "Incrementalist Animal Law: Welcome to the Real World".

go there

Sztybel, David. "Sztybelian Pragmatism versus Francionist Pseudo-Pragmatism".

go there

A Selection of Related Blog Entries

Anti-Cruelty Laws and Non-Violent Approximation

Use Not Treatment: Francione’s Cracked Nutshell

Francione Flees Debate with Me Again, Runs into the “Animal Jury”

The False Dilemma: Veganizing versus Legalizing

Veganism as a Baseline for Animal Rights: Two Different Senses

Francione's Three Feeble Critiques of My Views

Startling Decline in Meat Consumption Proves Francionists Are Wrong Once Again!

The Greatness of the Great Ape Project under Attack!

Francione Totally Misinterprets Singer

Francione's Animal Rights Theory

Francione on Unnecessary Suffering

My Appearance on AR Zone

D-Day for Francionists

Sztybel versus Francione on Animals' Property Status

The Red Carpet

Playing into the Hands of Animal Exploiters

The Abolitionist ApproachES

Francione's Mighty Boomerang

Dr. David Sztybel Home Page

Announcing New Essay on Animals and Normative Sociology

I would like to note here the publication of my first essay in a series of two on animals and normative sociology. Should sociology defend value judgments? Can that be done with any sort of convincing justification? Has that been done effectively by the intuitionists or do they merely dabble in baseless prejudices? Are animals effectively incorporated into contemporary normative sociology, or are they either neglected or inadequately attended to by various intuitionists? These exciting questions and a great deal more are addressed in this essay, which addresses a very wide swath of literature in an ambitious monograph survey. A fuller introduction to this essay is provided in my menu for academic articles.

I’ve Signed a Deal for My Animal Rights Ethics Book!

I am pleased to announce that my book on animal rights ethics, a philosophy work, will be published, likely some time in 2010 (the book is my main reason for not writing in my blog of late). I have been working on this project for more than 20 years now. It will realize the work promised in “The Rights of Animal Persons,” my essay that appeared in 2006 in what is now called The Journal for Critical Animal Studies, and also in a two-part series of articles in the same journal in which I outline my theory of best caring more rigorously (the second part appears in the next issue).

This book will defend animal rights rigorously. It will give the most sustained and complete defence of best caring yet, answering objections, and also considering competing ethical theories such as utilitarianism, the ethic of care, virtue ethics, ethical egoism, ecoholism, speciesist spirituality, superiorism, moral skepticism, and other views. I will present a case against vivisection, perhaps the thorniest of the animal ethics issues which has never been convincingly dealt with by previous authors. I will also sketch implications of the best caring approach for human animal rights.

The audience of the book will consist of those who read philosophy. This will obviously include certain university students and scholars, and also, say, members of the animal rights movement who are interested in animal ethics. It is written to be clear enough so that a university background is not required. Every animal activist should be interested in animal ethics at some level, since that is what animates the entire movement: moral concern for fellow sentient beings.

From this book, you can learn:

• how best caring embodies all of the advantages of the competing theories but not their disadvantages
  
• how a solution is needed to guarantee human rights at the level of theory too, since past human rights approaches are explicitly shown to fail (these rights theories do not even logically entail rights, nor, say, the refutation of their arch foes, the utilitarians)
  
• how to extend the feminist emphasis on “care” but without the fatal objections attendant to relying simply on sympathy and/or empathy in ethics
  
• seven refutations of superiorism, my devil’s advocate version of human-centred ethics that has been called the strongest case for humanism by many animal ethics scholars
  
• how we can overcome both crude egalitarianism for dilemmas as well as any threat to animal rights in preferring to save “the human over the worm”
  
• how deep ecology and animal rights can be reconciled
  
• how we might overcome the seemingly ubiquitous and calamitous reliance on intuitions in ethics
  
• in what precise sense animal rights may be said to win the debate with their opponents (here’s a clue: it does not involve considering all possible ideas related to animal rights that everyone in the universe is thinking of, has thought of, will think of, and is capable of thinking of--oh, and afterwards, keeping all of that in mind, showing that the ayes have it).

Activists need to rely on dependable research only, and this book intends to help the movement in that capacity given the gap left by intuitionists and other proponents of theories that simply do not work. Not only is there a lack of positive justification for animal rights, but even refutations of contrary theories in the existing literature are logically insufficient, as I point out in the book. Good intentions and popularity are certainly not enough to make a theory work, just as nobility is not enough to refute other views. In the end we need to rely on solid reasoning, and that is what I hope to offer the reading public with this book. We will need a lot of argumentative firepower on our side if we sincerely desire to win over a majority of citizens, academics, members of legislatures, and judiciaries.

There will be a Foreword by distinguished philosopher Michael Allen Fox, author of Deep Vegetarianism, who for years attacked animal liberation philosophy at conferences and in various publications, including his The Case for Animal Experimentation. Nine months after the publication of that book he recanted his views. You can also look forward to an Afterword from Ingrid Newkirk, who is perhaps directly and indirectly responsible for converting more people to animal rights than any other individual on the planet.

The title of the book will remain a secret until the appropriate time, but it is no longer Animal Persons which I regret (for reasons that I will not broach here) that I prematurely announced in “The Rights of Animal Persons."

I hope you will spread the word about this book if you think, like I do, that it will help to win the great cause of liberation.