Wednesday, September 9, 2009

Interlude: Thoughtful Debate as “In-Fighting”?"

I am going to take some time out while on the topic of critical discourse to address an old concern among animal rightists. Some activists think that conflicting claims among animal rights theorists amount to “fighting” with each other rather than with those who hurt animals. One example that is commonly used is the animal “welfare” versus fundamentalist debate. Characterizing exchanges between thinkers in this manner is a false, destructive, and distorting view. Ironically, it is trying to fight off valuable thinkers who are helping to clarify what animal rights is and what it means, as well as its justification. The importance of academic writing and debate for animal rights includes:

  • Developing more convincing arguments to influence opponents of animal rights and win them over. People who go ahead with mere opinions may feel powerful, affirmed, etc., but it is only with one’s own people, or unproductively “preaching to the choir,” and resting smug with one’s own insufficiently examined ideas. Mere opinions do not convince others. Only good arguments do that—or at least that is what should happen. And we have important people to win over, including ordinary citizens, lawmakers, and policymakers. Educators need to focus not only on getting ideas out there, but on trying to learn what are the best ideas in the first place.
  • If we as the animal rights movement do not prepare by weeding out bad AR arguments ourselves, the enemies of animal rights will do it for us. And we would not want to actually be caught, as public activists, using bad arguments and thus giving anti-animal-rightists any more credit to their side than they are due.
  • Keeping intellectual humility and avoiding arrogance is only possible if one sincerely believes and practices that one needs to justify what one is asking others to adopt, be it animal rights, veganism, suffering-reduction laws, or whatever.
  • Helping to decide important strategy questions such as whether to advocate “welfarist” legislation. These are of enormous significance to animals even if some are willing to bury their heads in the sand and dismiss it as mere “fighting.” Sure, activists vitally need to cooperate on common ground, but they need to settle some issues too.
  • Some frame this as an issue of loyalty to the animals, or being treacherous with respect to each other. Yet it is truest to the animals to forge the most convincing possible arguments on their behalf. It is most faithful to furthering animals’ interests to decide what is in their best interests in terms of strategies. It is truest to each other to reflect the truth for everyone, and to seek that everyone exercise their own best judgment. It is not self-centred to debate, if one does this without ego. It is rather getting away from everyone being self-centredly complacent about whatever they happen to believe, and not having the humility to seek the truth beyond oneself no matter what. The truth is without ego.
  • We need to choose our battles wisely, but some foolishly avoid all intellectual conflict and thus frown on trying to ascend to greater wisdom. And then fools’ opinions are counted right alongside deeply reflective counsel. Or rather, it is only bare opinions that survive. Theory is cast overboard as an imagined “threat” to activist unity, a kind of paranoid anti-intellectualism.
  • Seeking stronger unity in the long-term. If we try to paper over intellectual conflicts now, they still persist at a deeper level, only we fail to acknowledge them. This results in stifling conformism, and deep-seated alienation or even resentment. However, if one side convinces others due to winning arguments—which are more than possible—then more true unity emerges. And it is stronger than ever because it is bigger and better than ever. Solid justifications for views allow everyone to have a firmer sense of identity, purpose, and means of resolving conflicts without them becoming mere vague impasses that impede full-powered progress. Feelings of positive association and genuine “friendliness” would also increase, since people would genuinely have more in common, rather than forcing or pretending to have unity. That is, there need be no fighting off dissension and pretending there is unity. People who try to force artificial unity as opposed to developing authentic solidarity sometimes deal with differences “underground” by gossiping about opponents secretly, or subtle back-stabbing rather than respectful dialogue.
  • Trying to find truth. That is the purpose of academic inquiry, even when the conclusion of some scholars such as postmodernists is that truly there is no truth. It is superficial and confusing matters to characterize debate as “fighting” just because claims are conflicting. Sometimes what should be debates are carried on as fights, with insults, giving way to impulsive anger, revenge, stubbornly defending prejudices and dismissing the views of others, lack of forgiveness or flexibility, etc. Even just ignoring views is fighting them off in a sense. At its best debate does not involve fighting but learning. Views are not discarded because of “battle” but because they are lacking in evidence, and so are not worthy of support. The winning views have not “slain their enemies” but have merely revealed reality and dispelled illusions. People who mistake their own opinions for facts have given up long ago on the quest for truth, but it matters. Opinions that are not properly justified pose as truth but without the substantiation that is necessary to certify truth.
  • Greater empathy for “opponents.” We need to overcome viewing other animal rightists as enemies (unless of course they make themselves into genuine enemies!), but rather simply ones with different views. Through thoughtful debate, we acquire more empathy for others by more fully understanding alternative positions and the reasons behind them. Here we try to avoid the pitfall of thinking one knows others more than one actually does, and one actually takes the risk of really listening. Many think they are respecting others by promoting a thin and superficial “unity,” but meanwhile, their understanding of other views is limited to little more than crude stereotypes rather than true depth of understanding.
  • Mediation. Academic writing, if it offers convincing arguments and thus fulfills its purpose, can mediate conflict by actually settling disputes, at least among people with open minds. I have witnessed this rewarding phenomenon many times by seeing reports from people who have, in all good faith, changed their minds. People who have trouble articulating the right position (and I aver that such positions exist) are grateful to others who can do a better job of it because it is, for one thing, a professional preoccupation. Moreover, this mediation would be rational and fair, by considering justifications, criticisms, objections, and so on. So it is not mere “arbitration” or playing eenee-meanie-miney-mo with regard to matters of importance. There is no single “Dean of Animal Rights Ethics,” so we need to listen to everybody all around in a full-fledged dialogue, whenever that is possible.
  • Democracy. This form of decision-making at its best is rational, not just a rabble throwing up hands without duly thinking through whatever decision is at hand. It is best, I believe, to seek consensus as much as possible not through sheer domineering, but rather informed debate.

Overall, then, academic dispute should be viewed as something that can be overwhelmingly positive, and the perception that it is just idle “fighting” is ironically just a way of fighting off expending effort to be accountable for one’s views by taking justification seriously. Reasons for fighting off serious thinking include:

  • not wishing to have one’s prejudices challenged
  • laziness or not wanting to go to the bother of thinking very much
  • lack of developing studious habits, and not being comfortable with staying put and learning
  • fear of conflict, perhaps because of unfortunate experiences growing up in which conflicting views typically lead to vicious “battles”
  • self-servingly avoiding conflict just because being at odds makes one personally uncomfortable; opposition is not always easy but that does not mean it should always be avoided, for all that
  • short-sightedness about the importance for developing winning arguments
  • mistaking bad examples of debate with debate in general, thus negatively stereotyping
  • tar-and-feathering of academic debaters as “elitists,” even though they are, at their best, just trying to find the truth and what is best for animals. It is rather elitist to dismiss informed debate from the movement, assuming that it is only appropriate for certain university folk rather than the right of all activists
  • being influenced by certain academics who provide a distorted model of scholarly conduct by exhibiting no scruples about indulging in insulting as a substitute for dialogue, conveniently ignoring criticisms deemed fatal by a wide swath of others, and pandering to many peoples’ temptations by providing oversimplified conceptions
  • wanting to focus on “practical” aspects of activism (this is actually quite a legitimate position for an activist to take, but it does not justify expressing negativity towards those who do wish to debate intelligently or trying to fight off such people, ironically enough); we must not ignore that debate itself is a form of intellectual activism, and a practice all in itself on behalf of animals.

We can look at this issue in terms of crude, but still valuable, personality theory: True Colors. According to this widely disseminated and trademarked view, there are four basic personality types:

  1. Green (thinkers and intellectuals);
  2. Gold (methodical, by-the-book, rule-based people who run institutions with fiscally responsible, standard procedures);
  3. Blue (emotionally sensitive, caring about relationships, friendly, loving, keeping the peace, etc.);
  4. Orange (fun-loving, thrill-seeking, creative, sporting, helping to cultivate interest, entertainment and amusement).

People who are “Blue” might be disturbed seeing conflicts among the “Greens.” Why can’t we all just get along? Cooperation feels so much better than the conflict! Or Golds want to institute their goals and see debate as an “unproductive” impediment to simply implementing whatever happens to be on their minds, which they then take for granted and go forward with. Or Oranges find that intellectual debating is just not enough fun. Really, though, this is a case of certain personality types giving into potential weaknesses and thus, ironically, trying to fight off the Greens.

The Blues have a valuable peace-keeping role, but they should be focused on avoiding needless conflict, and ensuring solidarity on points on which we all (should) agree. Golds should implement policies that are rationally determined to be best for animals, and Oranges obviously need to hunker down and respect the value of work, including intellectual tasks, although ways of making debates interesting are to be encouraged. A fully integrated person will make some room for all of the “True Colors,” and also leave enough breathing room for others with different predominant colours (if that is the case) such as the Greens. We need our true colours to shine through with a full-spectrum approach. So yes, let us challenge the speciesists, but with better and better strategies, and arguments for overcoming oppression, that are—let’s face it—formulated chiefly by the Greens. This is not just a matter of: Go, Greens, go! Let all go forth, with animal rightists seeking and finding the most satisfying and effective forms of unity that are conceivable! “For the animals” means, in part, being for good and for truth, and also against “garbage” reasoning about animals that can and should be avoided!


FURTHER READING ON ANIMAL RIGHTS INCREMENTALISM

A Selection of Related Articles

Sztybel, David. "Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism". Journal for Critical Animal Studies 5 (1) (2007): 1-37.

go there

Short version of "Animal Rights Law".

go there

Sztybel, David. "Incrementalist Animal Law: Welcome to the Real World".

go there

Sztybel, David. "Sztybelian Pragmatism versus Francionist Pseudo-Pragmatism".

go there

A Selection of Related Blog Entries

Anti-Cruelty Laws and Non-Violent Approximation

Use Not Treatment: Francione’s Cracked Nutshell

Francione Flees Debate with Me Again, Runs into the “Animal Jury”

The False Dilemma: Veganizing versus Legalizing

Veganism as a Baseline for Animal Rights: Two Different Senses

Francione's Three Feeble Critiques of My Views

Startling Decline in Meat Consumption Proves Francionists Are Wrong Once Again!

The Greatness of the Great Ape Project under Attack!

Francione Totally Misinterprets Singer

Francione's Animal Rights Theory

Francione on Unnecessary Suffering

My Appearance on AR Zone

D-Day for Francionists

Sztybel versus Francione on Animals' Property Status

The Red Carpet

Playing into the Hands of Animal Exploiters

The Abolitionist ApproachES

Francione's Mighty Boomerang


Dr. David Sztybel Home Page

Wednesday, August 26, 2009

Crisis # 5a: Taking Criticisms of One's Own View Seriously: Francione's Animal Rights Theory

Accountability in animal ethics means being able to justify one's stance with good reasons. However, one can hardly do so if one's account falls due to logical criticisms that strictly adhere to the essence of what is being argued. Such criticisms cannot be shaken off because again they indelibly apply to the core of what is being asserted. As announced in the last blog entry, I am using the animal rights theory of Gary L. Francione as an example of a view that succumbs to such criticisms. These critiques are by no means dependent on accepting my own theory, but show how the view in question fails on its own terms, impartially considered. I have seen a lot in recent years of people, even academic theorists, being unconcerned with logical problems in their own views, and I think ego may have a lot to do with that. However, what happens in the wake of my criticisms is largely up to other people to decide. In the spirit of open discussion and fair debate, I offer the following critique of Francione's animal rights ethic. I agree with the latter in many respects, but find faults in its reasoning, a very important difficulty for any philosophy. To read this excerpt from my forthcoming book, in PDF format (page and footnote numbers differ from the book), please click HERE.

Tuesday, August 25, 2009

Modification to Crisis # 5: Taking Criticisms Seriously

I have already outlined the series of crises I am currently commenting on in my blog. The pacing of their unfolding is slow because of my many commitments, but I remind my readers that some of the finest things require time: wine (not that I drink), well-laid plans, and maturity to take a few examples. Crisis #5 was about a failure in critical theory. The aspect of critical theory mentioned in the original entry for September 21, 2008, Item 5., is about how current animal ethics theories fail to launch effective objections against other theories. These objections tend to beg the question, jump to conclusions, etc. I will soon use the writing of Tom Regan as an example in this respect. However, there is another dimension to critical theory that 5. neglected. Many animal rights theorists fail to reckon with criticisms of their own views. I will edit that entry from last September accordingly to include this other aspect.

My example for this part will be the animal rights theory of Professor Gary L. Francione, which I promised earlier in the blog I would discuss anyway. It makes sense since I have already engaged with a whole other aspect of his theory, his stance on acceptable animal legislation (not that he seems to advocate a legislative approach at this time, as noted earlier).

I will feature a special preview (in draft) from my own forthcoming animal rights ethics book. Note that I do not yet include material from Francione's latest book, a collection of essays entitled Animals as Persons, but since it features no alteration in his basic theory, there is no hurry on that score. I have found so many flaws in Francione's writing, detailed in this blog and in my journal article, "Animal Rights Law," that I am not eager to thoroughly read and perhaps respond in writing to his new book. The track record suggests that it would just be another laborious exercise in having to face logically flawed, tediously repetitive, and spottily organized material. Other projects seem more appealing at present.

Wednesday, July 29, 2009

New: "Animal Rights Made Simple"

This notice is an interlude in my ongoing series on the crises in animal ethics. Today I am posting for the first time on this website a two-page essay, "Animal Rights Made Simple," in PDF format. I will offer a word of explanation. Clarity is my first rule of style, otherwise communication becomes self-defeating, and the message is lost. At the same time, academic writing with clarity as a guiding principle is not always accessible to everyone, especially if the material is developed with rigour. Rigorous perspectives consider all objections, contrary theories, and elaborate one's own view thoroughly. Not everyone has the staying-power for such work, for different reasons. However, I believe that a case for animal rights can be made convincingly in relatively simple terms. I am still a theorist, and what I am doing here is simplifying a system of ideas. This is not an exercise in rhetoric, where animal suffering is detailed and an attempt is made to inflame people to action on the basis of sheer outrage. That said, animal oppression is grossly outrageous! Given, however, my logical approach, even animal rights made simple is still only the case for those who are able to think logically. Having done my share of high school teaching, I mourn that most students are not trained in this way. It could be otherwise, though. The basic ideas in my best caring theory are VERY clear and simple, and add up to equally clear animal rights conclusions. Although to some extent I deal in abstractions, it would be a mistake to think of, say, ruling out bad things when possible as a "mere abstraction." On the contrary, it is a sweeping generalization that makes reference to any number of concrete instances in which animals are subject to, for example, suffering in often intense and various ways. It ranges from the suffocation of the fish out of water to the docking of a pig's tail, with literally endless examples to add even in terms of detailing general KINDS of suffering... If someone fails to see the concrete because the abstract is used, that is simply a failure of understanding of what is referred to, and perhaps a failure of imagination to see beyond the mere idea to the realities encompassed by the idea. So this brochure I see as perhaps being useful on college and university campuses, internet discussion forums, or as a tool to have at information tablings or street education efforts, since occasionally very thoughtful people appear who wish to think critically about animal protection issues. It is not something that will reach everyone. However, that is not an "elitist" assumption. If people in our society were better educated, everything in "Animal Rights Made Simple" would be dirt-simple to most everyone. It is rather because society is elitist that logical appeals only reach relatively few people. Instead, arguments are often thrown out the window and atrocity images and quick statistics are used instead, recognizing that media "sound bites" and "flashing images" have a very limited attention span on the receiving end. It would be elitist to give up on the importance of logic and to cynically assume that any brochure cannot reflect a more-or-less complete argument (for the purposes of a brochure, anyway). I hope that people will find "Animal Rights Made Simple" to be of use, then, in their outreach to thinking people who are also compassionate.

Tuesday, July 7, 2009

Crisis #4: Unprotective Anti-Vivisection Theories

Strong animal rights theories are intended to protect animals, at least in theory, against vivisection. This is a goal that I support. I have already commented (see entry for Jan. 27/09) on how the various rights theories contain frameworks that do not logically entail strong rights. The logic of these views could also, honestly speaking, lead to utilitarianism. That alone makes past rights frameworks unprotective of animals, since utilitarian logic is the #1 way of rationalizing vivisection. The utilitarians admit that animals are harmed in, say, medical vivisection, but assert that this harm is outweighed by the harm that is eliminated by developing cures for humans (and perhaps other animals, but we know what the usual priorities are) using medical vivisection research results, and therapies and treatments that are allegedly based on such practices. This is trying to help patients using “models” that are harmful for the nonhuman victims.

Another point already made, another crisis if you will, is the intuitionist crisis in animal ethics (see entry for January 26/09). Since ALL of the main rights theories thus far are based on “intuitions,” as I have shown, this also creates problems for being firm about anti-vivisection. For the moment you admit intuitions, you must admit the possibility of utilitarian intuitions too, for example. This criticism is related to but different from the previous one, and it applies to all of the rights theories, only some of which are openly intuitionist. Most of them are crypto-intuitionist, or rely on rock-bottom opinions or assumptions that are not rationally justified—although not openly realizing or confessing this fact.

However, the failure to rule out vivisection becomes even deeper when we look at rather logically embarrassing individual efforts of theorists to address the vivisection issue in particular. I will focus on medical vivisection since, although I utterly oppose the practice, it stands the best chance of being justifiable, because it addresses a human need (albeit other animals’ needs are at stake too), unlike vivisection for curiosity or to test new lines of makeup. We can get rid of meat-eating without much sacrifice, it seems to me, and eliminating that harm to animals does not lead to any other harms that cannot be compensated (animal agriculture jobs can be replaced with plant agriculture or other jobs; people can find nutritious and tasty meals from within the plant kingdom). Medical vivisection, unlike meat-eating, is often interpreted to pose a dilemma between either harm to animals if vivisection is done or harm to humans if the research is not done. It is purportedly a conflict between life and health needs and/or vital interests of humans and other animals.

Tom Regan is often called the intellectual leader of the animal rights movement. He favors a ban on all vivisection. (Regan 1983, 393) This conclusion is based on Regan’s argument that animals, alongside humans, have equal inherent value. From the fact that we have equal inherent value, Regan derives “the respect principle.” And from the respect principle, in turn, he derives “the harm principle.” The latter would less confusingly be labeled “the nonharming principle” since that is Regan’s intent. In any cases, these intuitively based principles are taken to rule out the harm of vivisection.

One problem with Regan’s claiming he has formulated a case against medical vivisection though is that in The Case for Animal Rights, he presents various principles for overriding rights. First, he favors overriding the minimum number of rights of the innocent when other innocents will be harmed in a comparable way if one does not override the rights. (Ibid., 305) Stated more simply, the foregoing means: I can sacrifice some innocents to save others if comparable harms are at stake in making the sacrifice, so long as the minimum number of rights are overridden. Furthermore, he tells us that in prevention of harm cases, Martha’s right can override Nora’s right if Martha faces greater harm. (Ibid., 309)

What implications do Regan’s principles for overriding of rights have for medical vivisection? Animal experimenters will claim that sick humans are innocent and have a right to life. Sacrificing a finite number of animals can allegedly result in cures for endless humans. This means a greater number of rights of humans will supposedly be respected than there will be animals’ rights that are violated. Since Regan favors overriding the lesser number of rights, this may imply advocacy of vivisection.

Also, the extent of harm done to animals in experiments is generally comparable to the egregious human disease effects that the experiments are meant to replicate. However, it can be additionally argued that greater harm is done to the human if the experiments are not done, using the criteria that Regan himself invokes to resolve lifeboat cases. If a lifeboat is sinking that contains four humans and a dog, and only four of the creatures can be successfully floated, then Regan says we should toss the dog overboard. That is because, Regan assures us, killing each individual (normal) human in the boat would foreclose more “opportunities for satisfaction” than killing the dog. (Ibid., 324)

So one can argue that there is a lesser harm in experimenting on animals both quantitatively, because of the number of lives saved (using an optimistic picture of medical vivisection, recited above, that I do not myself subscribe to), and also because the amount of harm suffered by humans is supposedly qualitatively greater than harm suffered by animals who are subjected to similar physical or psychological conditions. Unfortunately, the lesser harm figures into Regan’s principles for overriding rights in a way that might make medical vivisection “necessary” to defend using his principles.

Regan claims that such rights-overriding reasoning is exceptional, not routine like animal experiments. (Ibid., 325) However, the most logical and straightforward way to deploy principles is simply to apply them in all cases in which they are applicable. The last statement must also be true of principles for overriding rights. Regan cannot arbitrarily pick and choose how to apply his principles depending on his favorite conclusions that he wishes to reach. Moreover, medical vivisection can indeed be argued to be “exceptional” among animal usages because it supposedly confers benefits that are allegedly difficult to replace unlike meat-eating, fur-wearing, using animal ingredients, animals being enslaved for entertainment, and any number of other uses.

Regan claims that experimenting on animals reduces animals’ value to their utility to others and thus treats them as renewable resources. (Ibid., 397) However, it could be argued that animals are not used as a “mere” means (to adapt Kant’s phrasing here) if the animals are deemed to have inherent value, only their right to life is overridden in favor of others’ rights to life using Regan’s own principles. Such a view grants animals strong rights, in most cases, and does not treat them as mere resources. Certainly we cannot merely stipulate that animal rights means abolishing vivisection. This needs to follow if at all, as a logical implication of a well-reasoned ethical theory, presumably some form of animal rights view.

Regan offers other unconvincing anti-vivisection ideas. He writes, in the Preface of the 2004 second edition of The Case for Animal Rights, p. xxx-xxxi, that it violates animals’ rights to be in the laboratory in the first place. However, vivisectors might not wrongly override animals’ rights if they accord with Regan’s own principles for overriding rights. In general, it is perilous to pit rights against principles for overriding rights, since the latter will tend to trump.

Regan also rejects utilitarian-style aggregation and its minimizing of overall harm, but we can treat medical vivisection as a conflict of rights to life without relying at all on utilitarianism. Also, even Regan uses aggregation (though not admittedly) in saving fifty miners instead of one. (Regan 1983, 301) You see, all that aggregation means is “adding together,” and overriding the minimum number of rights adds potential rights violations together and is therefore a form of aggregation. He claims that aggregate consequences do not matter but respect for the equality of individuals does. (Ibid., 307) However, “equality” in this context partly amounts to counting each individual once, not more or less, when seeking to preserve the most number of rights. He still aggregates consequences in terms of rights-violations/fulfillments in saving the fifty miners instead of the one.

In another book, Empty Cages, Regan claims that medical researchers appeal to benefits from medical vivisection is question-begging because such arguments assume those benefits are morally legitimate. (Regan 2004, 174) However, Regan also begs the question by merely assuming that these benefits are morally illegitimate (especially given his intuitionist assumptions on which his theory rests, and the way his own principles justify harming someone to secure the benefit of a lesser harm for someone else).

Regan also points out (Ibid., 174-176) that animal researchers (1) do not take steps to minimize harm to animals; (2) overestimate benefits of such research; and (3) underestimate harm to humans (because drugs tested safe and effective on animals can harm humans, or those substances tested unsafe or ineffective on animals may help humans). Fair enough. Yet these last three points, however true they may be, do not require abolishing medical vivisection, some of which may both minimize harm to animals and promise benefits but not harms for humans.

So Regan expends much intellectual vigor opposing medical vivisection, but he is even more energetically rebuffed by the logical implications of his own reasoning which seem to favour the practice.

Does Gary Francione do any better in protecting animals from vivisection, as he claims his theory does? He challenges audiences around the world during his talks: Would you use a severely retarded human for cancer research if it was thought to yield valuable data? He reports that no one has ever raised a hand in favor. (Francione 2000, 91) Not surprisingly for a lawyer, Francione notes that the 1947 Nuremberg Code, drafted after the horrors of the Nazi doctors who vivisected Jews and others, forbids research on unconsenting research subjects, and also, the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki by the World Medical Association prohibits using humans without full information and consent. (Ibid., 92) However, Francione is here committing the fallacy of appeal to popular opinion. I say this because some thinkers do openly advocate using mentally disabled humans as well as animals for medical vivisection, such as utilitarian R. G. Frey. (Frey 1987, 89) Francione’s reasoning has no bearing on Frey, although that is precisely the position that needs to be refuted.

We have already seen how Francione’s principle of equal consideration does not rule out utilitarianism, and so begs the question against that theory when he insists on a neo-Kantian framework that no one should be treated as property. David Langlois has clarified to me that not being considered property means more than the idea that no one should be treated as owned. Francione thinks that not being property also means not being treated as a resource, slave, etc. although this idea, very similar to Regan’s notion of inherent value, again is merely intuitive and thoroughly begs the question against alternative philosophies such as utilitarianism or ethical egoism (a view I will not elaborate here), for example. By Francione’s own admission, the principle of equal consideration just means treating like cases alike unless there is a “good reason” not to. (Francione 2000, 82) However, both of the just-mentioned moral philosophies treat like cases alike, unless there is a “good reason” not to according to each theorist’s analysis of “good reasons.” In turn, each philosophy claims to have a “good reason” to treat animals differently from normal humans in the case of medical vivisection. Francione simply begs the question against such theories’ versions of “good reasons” at his own logical peril.

Also, Francione admits that we can prefer to rescue humans over other animals in cases of emergency. (Ibid., xxxvi) If this is allowed in dilemmas, why not also more generally, thus pushing animals into the vivisection lab? Why should not animals be treated as property, suffering forcible harm, rather than humans suffering involuntarily and helplessly from diseases? After all, emergencies can result in rights not being respected, as in the old school case Francione often gives of only being able to pull one being from a burning building. Why not disregard the rights of animals while instead affirming the rights of humans? He does not refute the idea that medical vivisection itself constitutes a moral dilemma.

He further asserts that his view rests “comfortably” on two assertions: (1) that we can prefer humans in cases of necessity; and (2) it is wrong to inflict unnecessary suffering on animals. (Ibid., xxxvi) However, vivisectionists will say that life or death matters are indeed cases of necessity, and so vivisection does not involve inflicting any “unnecessary suffering” on animals, since they favor humans in a contest between human needs and animal needs. Francione has nothing to say in response to this criticism, only his earlier impotent reliance on the fallacy of popular opinion.

Evelyn Pluhar, like Regan or Francione, does not present a convincing refutation of utilitarian defences of animal experimentation; her attempts to refute utilitarianism try to point out how it leads to the killing of innocents, although this strategy rather begs the question, (Pluhar 1995, ch. 4) simply assuming (however plausibly to rights advocates) that we should not tolerate such outcomes.

Steve Sapontzis seeks to integrate animal rights and utilitarianism, (Sapontzis 1987, xii) and so he does not object to utilitarianism per se, although he opposes animal experiments because he holds that animals can never be consenting. (Ibid., 209-216) However, consider (in the way a utilitarian might) the comforts of having one’s consent respected and also the suffering of being forced. Can the values of these utilities be outweighed by the supposedly huge and perpetual benefits of medical vivisection? A lot of vivisectionists would say “yes.” Sapontzis then does not provide secure grounds against vivisection either.

Mark Rowlands tries to refute medical vivisection’s supposed acceptability by his adaptation of John Rawls’ theory of justice. I’ve described this theory earlier in my blog, but it entails that people who negotiate principles of justice in the original or impartial position would not vote in favor of social rules that would permit themselves to be vivisected. That would go against their self-interest. (Rowlands 2002, 151) After all, who, in an impartial position, would vote in favor of a principle where they end up being vivisected—given that they do not know what life circumstances they will end up in behind the so-called “veil of ignorance” (a condition attached to the impartial position). This is actually one of the more plausible ways of criticizing medical vivisection among the various animal rights theories.

However, Rawls’ view is too full of holes. Rawls’ “original position” takes it for granted that one must never (or hardly ever) act contrary to one’s own self-interest. However, Peter Singer and other utilitarians take it for granted that their own very different “original position” equally considers all equivalent interests, and is open to others’ interests overriding one’s own self-interest. Which one is right? Merely taking any one theory for granted does not answer this question. In other words, Rawls and Rowlands profoundly beg the question against utilitarian arguments for vivisection. Rowlands, in his animal rights version, in effect merely stipulates that we should not vivisect in that he contrives an original position that happens to carry his sought-after implication.

Julian Franklin (2005) purely takes it for granted that his framework is anti-vivisectionist, but he does not offer a way to refute the contention that vivisection resolves a dilemma between animal rights and human rights. Joan Dunayer (2004) and Bernard Rollin (1992) also do not offer such a much-needed way out. Even if we agree with their rejection of utilitarianism, they (like Regan and others) do not show how vivisection is to be ruled out in terms of their favored approach of rights.

What about Peter Singer? A lot of people mistakenly think that he totally opposes vivisection. Others say he advocates the practice. The truth is unclear, because he declares things consistent with both positions and is actually badly inconsistent overall, as I will now demonstrate. In his essay, “The Value of Animal Life,” Singer states that we can defend medical vivisection:

The knowledge gained from some experiments on animals does save lives and reduce suffering. Hence, the benefits of animal experimentation exceed the benefits of eating animals and the former stands a better chance of being justifiable than the latter; but this applies only when an experiment on an animal fulfils strict conditions relating to the significance of the knowledge to be gained, the unavailability of alternative techniques not involving animals, and the care taken to avoid pain. Under these conditions the death of an animal in an experiment can be defended. (Singer 1980, 254)

He adds that we can defend such research also on humans who have lesser mental capacities, like animals. (Ibid.)

In Animal Liberation, Singer’s signal contribution to animal ethics, he clearly implies that we do not need to advocate a wholesale abolition of animal experimentation:

All we need to say is that experiments serving no direct and urgent purpose should stop immediately, and in the remaining fields of research, we should, whenever possible, seek to replace experiments that involve animals with alternative methods that do not. (Singer 1990, 40)

This last statement says we need only call for reducing, not eliminating animal research, and that it may not even be “possible” to replace some experiments. Similarly, Singer was once challenged as to whether a particular animal experiment conducted by a Professor Azzis may be justified. (Singer 2006) Singer said he needed to evaluate the particulars of the experiment, with which he was unfamiliar. Finally, in another important Singer book, Practical Ethics, he makes his utilitarian pro-vivisection logic finally clear for all to see:

In the past, argument about animal experimentation has often…been put in absolutist terms: would the opponent of experimentation be prepared to let thousands die from a terrible disease that could be cured by experimenting on one animal?...I think the question should be answered affirmatively—in other words, if one, or even a dozen animals had to suffer experiments in order to save thousands, I would think it right and in accordance with equal consideration of interests that they should do so. This, at any rate, is the answer a utilitarian must give. Those who believe in absolute rights might hold that it is always wrong to sacrifice one being, whether human or animal, for the benefit of another. (Singer 1993, 67)

In the above quotation Singer shows his sympathy for utilitarian logic. He adds (p. 68) that if we eliminate speciesist bias and also use humans who are mentally equivalent to animals, then “…the number of experiments performed on animals would be greatly reduced.” Again, we see the theme of reducing rather than eliminating animal (and, it is implied, human) experiments which is also documented from Animal Liberation above.

Thus Singer talks out of one side of his mouth like a supporter of some few animal experiments in which the costs are supposedly outweighed by the benefits.

At other times, Singer talks the opposite. In another part of Animal Liberation, Singer writes:

…the ethical question of the justifiability of animal experimentation cannot be settled by pointing to its benefits for us, no matter how persuasive the evidence in favor of such benefits may be. The ethical principle of equal consideration of interests will rule out some means of obtaining knowledge. We always accept many restrictions on scientific enterprise. We do not believe that scientists have a general right to perform painful or lethal experiments on human beings without their consent, although there are many cases in which such experiments would advance knowledge far more rapidly than any other method. Now, we need to broaden the scope of this existing restriction on scientific research. (Singer 1990, 92)

This sounds like an abolitionist argument against animal experiments. However, perhaps we need to think like a lawyer here, looking for “escape clauses,” given Singer’s advocacy of vivisection elsewhere. Sure enough. He states in the quote that “some means” of obtaining knowledge are to be ruled out (not necessarily all means). Scientists lack a “general right” (although that leaves rooms for exceptional rights). Also, he advocated that society “broaden the scope” of a restriction, but this does not require that we do so to the degree of 100%. In any event, Singer’s consent argument is highly similar to Sapontzis’ argument, noted above (which was actually expressed long after Singer’s version), which also invokes animals’ systematic lack of consent. Like Sapontzis’ view, Singer’s is quite vulnerable to the utilities associated with consent being outweighed by the benefits of vivisection, a view that we have seen Singer elsewhere seems to hold such as in passages quoted above.

We need to appreciate just how contradictory this is. In the last quote reprinted, Singer is saying that the benefits to humans do not vindicate animal research because it violates the need for consent, a principle which we need to extend to animals. However, in the pro-vivisection passages, he does not even consider consent, and instead cites the benefits of the research as justifying the practice. These are totally incompatible claims. On Singer’s Frequently Asked Questions section of his website, he suggests that although individual animal experiments might be justified, he does not favor the institutional practice of vivisection since few experiments would be of benefit, and resources would be better spent otherwise. (Singer 2009) However, Azzis’ experiment which he hesitates over in the above citation (and which Singer also mentions in that very same FAQ passage, warning that people surprised by this reaction have not read him carefully in the past as not ruling out all vivisection), IS an instance of institutionalized animal experimentation. So once again we have a contradiction. Are institutional animal experiments unjustified like Singer says? If they are not justified, as he plainly states, then why hesitate over Dr. Azzis’ institutional vivisection practices?

So what to believe about Singer? His plea for abolishing (or somewhat restricting?) vivisection on the basis of animals not consenting is an isolated although important statement. He does not raise the issue of consent elsewhere regarding animal experiments. In any event his consent-based "anti-vivisection" statement is not absolute, as I have analyzed, and his FAQ's condemnation of institutional vivisection is tarnished with hesitations over Azzis' experiments conducted in his particular institution. Whatever Singer’s opinion may happen to be, the fact is that his framework, utilitarianism, cannot rule out vivisection and is the #1 framework used to defend the practice in the way he himself usually does (judging by the number of relevant passages that I can find, at any rate).

That said, animal rights theories are the #1 means used to rule out vivisection ethically, although the ethics of care theory also sometimes carries that anti-vivisectionist conclusion (they also face this dilemma: is it more “caring” to offset harm to humans or to animals? No ethics of care theorist such as Carol Adams or Josephine Donovan—see Donovan and Adams 1996—has adequately, if at all, addressed this problem). But we have seen that animal rights views such as Regan’s either unwittingly conduce towards justifying medical vivisection, or else fail to stave off a seeming “animal rights” justification of vivisection: judging between a supposed dilemma between animal rights and human rights.

Anyone who cares about vivisection—or even just logic—should be quite concerned by these findings from our brief survey of anti-vivisection ethics. Is there a way out of this theoretical miasma, that left by itself, altogether fails the poor animals targeted for this hideously hellish practice? I say: yes. I have already published on these issues to some extent (Sztybel 2006a, 2006b) and will address this crisis of anti-vivisection theory much more thoroughly in my forthcoming book on animal rights ethics.

References

Donovan, Josephine, and Carol J. Adams (eds.). 1996. Beyond Animal Rights: a Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment of Animals. New York: Continuum. [See also Adams’ essay on vivisection featured in her anthology of her own essays entitled Neither Man Nor Beast.]

Dunayer, Joan. Speciesism. Derwood: Ryce Publishing.

Francione, Gary L. 2000. Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Franklin, Julian. Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press.

Frey, R. G. 1987. “Animal Parts, Human Wholes.” Biomedical Ethics Reviews—1987, eds. James M. Humber and Robert F. Almeder. Clifton, NJ: Humana Press.

Pluhar, Evelyn B. 1995. Beyond Prejudice: the Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals. Durham: Duke University Press.

Regan, Tom. 2004. Empty Cages: Facing the Challenge of Animal Rights. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.

Regan, Tom. 1983. The Case for Animal Rights. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Rollin, Bernard. 1992. Animal Rights and Human Morality: Revised Edition. Buffalo: Prometheus Books. First edition published in 1981.

Rowlands, Mark. 2002. Animals Like Us. London: Verso.

Singer, Peter. 2009. Princeton University website. http://www.princeton.edu/~psinger. Retrieved July 6, 2009.

Singer, Peter. 2006. The Sunday Times, December 3.

Singer, Peter. 1993. Practical Ethics. Second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Singer, Peter. 1990. Animal Liberation. Second Edition. New York: Avon Books.

Singer, Peter. 1980. “Animals and the Value of Life.” In Matters of Life and Death, ed. Tom Regan. New York: Random House.

Sztybel, David. 2006a. “A Living Will Clause for Supporters of Animal Experimentation.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (May 2006): 173-189.

Sztybel, David. 2006b. “The Rights of Animal Persons.” Journal for Critical Animal Studies 4 (1): 1-37.

Monday, May 4, 2009

Crisis #3: the Conundrum over Animal Equality

We are in a state of crisis regarding notions of animal equality. Animal liberation implies some kind of animal equality. For Peter Singer, a utilitarian, in his book Animal Liberation it means equal consideration of equivalent interests, such as not suffering. However, for him, different animal lives are of differential value depending on whether they involve self-awareness, planning, advanced communication, complex social relationships, and other characteristics. For Tom Regan, an animal rights theorist whose views are mainly articulated in The Case for Animal Rights, animals who are routinely exploited often may be considered not merely living, but “subjects of a life,” and they each have “equal inherent value.” Yet in dilemmas, if we have to choose between saving a human and a dog, say, in a burning building in which you can only pull one form the fire, Regan would say to save the dog because nonhuman animals supposedly have fewer “opportunities for satisfaction.”

Joan Dunayer, in her book, Speciesism, is more of an absolute egalitarian. She states that it would be perfectly moral to flip a coin in the case of the dog versus the human. She calls Singer and Regan “new speciesists” because they do not take equality of sentient beings all the way down the line, so to speak. Not only this, but she calls for equal rights for insects, as well. Paola Cavalieri, in The Animal Question, also calls for equality of all conscious beings, undermining any appeals to real or supposed cognitive sophistication.

I believe that these debates over equality raise a crisis. David Selby writes:

Do all non-human animals have rights, and if so, do they all possess them to the same extent?….If sentience is the key determinant in the possession of rights, are the rights of species to be graded according to the degree of sentience? Where do the tsetse fly, the malarial mosquito, the locust, the tapeworm and the myriad organisms that invade our bloodstream and make us ill stand in the animal rights landscape?(Selby, Earthkind (1995), pp. 8-9)

And Stephen Wise writes:

Let those who would ridicule the argument that legal rights should not be restricted to human beings link the rights of chimpanzees and mosquitoes. If the link can be forged, it is likely that no nonhuman animal will ever obtain legal rights. (Wise, "Thunder without Rain," Animal Law 3 (1997): 50)

Is this really a crisis? Why not just settle for Dunayer’s and Cavalieri’s simpler view of equality across the board?

I think the crisis is this: most people would view it as highly objectionable to toss a coin between saving a human or a maggot, other things being equal. And they have the sense, however intuitive, that there are sound reasons for such a choice, if only they could be clearly articulated. They do not think they are speciesist. So either we go by the radical egalitarian view of Dunayer and Cavalieri, which seems to lead to this objectionable consequence and to reduce animal liberation to absurdity in most people’s minds, or else we have inequality in certain cases, and then it becomes a question as to whether this inequality should spread across the board, so that animals would enjoy no equal rights whatsoever. That might be an invitation to animal exploitation. Regan does not state what separates a dilemma from a normal situation in The Case for Animal Rights. He just asserts that there is a difference. Moreover, “opportunities for satisfaction” could lead to our saving the rich over the poor. Francione expresses that our intuition tells us that we should save a human over a dog if we know nothing about the individuals except their species, but intuition tells us exactly nothing as to why we should choose this way. Other animal rights philosophers such as Julian Franklin, Mark Rowlands, Bernard Rollin, and others simply do not tell us how to choose in such dilemmas.

In sum, is animal liberation DOOMED? On the one hand, undermining animal equality in any way might doom animal liberation, which seems to be based on some form of egalitarianism. On the other hand, having absolute equality seems to lead to absurdities, and absurd implications of animal liberation might also threaten animal liberation as a whole with possible untenability. A majority of society would not accept such an implication even if some extremists are content to flip a coin between a baby and a flea. The thought that someone might rescue a tiny insect trapped in a droplet of water gives me joy, but someone who says they’d flip a coin between saving a human or such an insect frankly makes me feel a bit sickened.

I believe that we can find principled grounds for distinguishing such cases, and also logical reasons for preferring humans to blow-flies in dilemmas, while still consistently maintaining a broad-based equality. Indeed, my own theory includes a strict duty to refrain from harming, say, insects if that is reasonably avoidable. However, such a theory must withstand objections from Dunayer and Cavalieri, e.g., that humans are not really intellectually superior, that cognitive capacities are morally irrelevant and so forth. I believe that such a theory is possible and my forthcoming book (and a research paper, if I have time to write it; there are so many papers and books that I feel the need to write!) will seek to enunciate this view. Thus it may be possible to transcend the crisis of either human-caterpillar absolute equality on the one hand, and creeping inegalitarianism across the board resulting in routine harming of nonhuman animals, including insects, on the other hand.

Friday, March 20, 2009

Blog Reformat

Sometimes when people read a blog, they want to start with the latest entry. That is the traditional format, and is suitable for more or less regular readers. However, sometimes readers are new to the blog. Especially when items are entered in a series, it makes more sense for such individuals perhaps to read from earliest to latest. Therefore, at my blogsite, I now offer a choice of reading the entries from latest down to earliest, as before, but also from earliest through to the most recent. This should serve to make my blog more user-friendly.

Thursday, March 19, 2009

Update Regarding Great Apes Activism

At Brock University in a fourth-year seminar course on animals and the law, we extensively discuss great apes advocacy. On June 10, 2008 I made a blog entry defending such advocacy against Francione's attack on the Great Ape Project, which he used to support but no longer does. Rethinking these issues has occasioned me to revise the earlier entry in that I more clearly outline that the pragmatist approach has four major advantages over Francione's negativist proposal, and shares the advantage that his enjoys of utterly criticizing speciesist arguments that beings should have rights because they have human-like cognitive characteristics.



FURTHER READING ON ANIMAL RIGHTS INCREMENTALISM

A Selection of Related Articles

Sztybel, David. "Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism". Journal for Critical Animal Studies 5 (1) (2007): 1-37.

go there

Short version of "Animal Rights Law".

go there

Sztybel, David. "Incrementalist Animal Law: Welcome to the Real World".

go there

Sztybel, David. "Sztybelian Pragmatism versus Francionist Pseudo-Pragmatism".

go there

A Selection of Related Blog Entries

Anti-Cruelty Laws and Non-Violent Approximation

Use Not Treatment: Francione’s Cracked Nutshell

Francione Flees Debate with Me Again, Runs into the “Animal Jury”

The False Dilemma: Veganizing versus Legalizing

Veganism as a Baseline for Animal Rights: Two Different Senses

Francione's Three Feeble Critiques of My Views

Startling Decline in Meat Consumption Proves Francionists Are Wrong Once Again!

The Greatness of the Great Ape Project under Attack!

Francione Totally Misinterprets Singer

Francione's Animal Rights Theory

Francione on Unnecessary Suffering

My Appearance on AR Zone

D-Day for Francionists

Sztybel versus Francione on Animals' Property Status

The Red Carpet

Playing into the Hands of Animal Exploiters

The Abolitionist ApproachES

Francione's Mighty Boomerang


Dr. David Sztybel Home Page

Tuesday, January 27, 2009

Crisis #2: The Crisis of Inconclusive (Animal) Rights Theories

The crisis in rights theories not leading to strong rights, an extraordinary outcome, is somewhat detailed in “The Rights of Animal Persons.” However, since I am doing a series on crises in animal ethics (not all are discussed in the essay just mentioned), expanding on the list posted in September, I will briefly discuss this difficulty. The major approaches to animal rights hitherto duplicate human rights theory in the arena of animal ethics. They are: (1) intuitionism; (2) compassion; (3) tradition; (4) Kant’s theory; (5) Rawls’ theory; and (6) Gewirth’s theory. I actually discuss all of these theories in the last post, so I will not bore the reader with a repetition. Minimally, these rights theories do not entail strong rights, but are compatible with utilitarian vivisection for medical purposes, for example, because: (1) one can have utilitarian intuitions; (2) utilitarianism can claim to be “compassionate”; (3) there are utilitarian traditions; (4) Kant claims we should go by universalizable principles, but we can universalize utilitarianism; (5) we can set utilitarian principles of justice from “the original position” (see last post for details); (6) utilitarianism is compatible with needing freedom and well-being, and the principle of generic consistency, or treating like things alike. I also can show that sado-masochism is compatible with all of these frameworks too. It might seem odd to say that in the case of compassion, but if ethics is based on the compassion that people happen to have—well, sado-masochists might not have much. If compassion is advocated as an ideal because it promotes good, sadism can produce a good. In any event, these rights frameworks are grossly indeterminate. They do not result in what their advocates claim, which is a pity, because even granted the assumptions they wish others to share, their conclusions do not follow. And it is asking a lot to have others simply agree to one’s intuitive assumptions. Last time I showed that all of the frameworks are either intuitionist or crypto-intuitionist as well. Surely it is a crisis in rights theory if they do not even vindicate rights!

Monday, January 26, 2009

Crisis #1: The Poverty of Justification in (Animal) Ethics: Intuitionism

I am sorry I was not able to keep up my blog in the months since my last entry. I was unavoidably detained by a time-sensitive project of (for me) overwhelming magnitude. Therefore, my last blogging was in the fall, and I now write in the bitter cold of the Canadian winter.

Last time I indicated that animal ethics is in crisis, which is no small claim. The first indicator of crisis status was my observation that most of the ethical theories are intuitionist. What does intuitionism mean? Intuitions are rock-bottom beliefs in ethics, and intuitionists claim that it is neither possible nor necessary to justify intuitions. Because they are rock-bottom or foundational, no reason can be given to justify intuitive beliefs. If another belief is introduced to justify an intuition, then the intuition itself is no longer basic to the system. (Note for specialists: “foundational” here does not necessarily mean that someone is committed to what is called a foundationalist epistemology, only that no more basic belief is given to justify the intuition.)

What are some examples of intuitions? First, let it be noted that thinkers can be either explicit or implicit intuitionists. An explicit intuitionist will discuss their intuitions quite openly. We can interpret someone to be a covert intuitionist, though, if they offer beliefs that are seemingly basic to their system, and no attempt is made to justify the belief, or even to indicate that a justification is needed. We can analyze the leading ethical theories, which have been extended to animal ethics, in terms of intuitions. These theories are: utilitarianism, the feminist ethics of care, ethical egoism, and virtue ethics, and right theories.

Utilitarianism is based on the intuitions that: (1) the good can be analyzed into good = pleasure and bad = pain (or else good = preference-satisfaction and bad = preference-frustration); (2) we ought to maximize the good and minimize the bad overall. (This rough-and-ready sketch does not account for the intuitions of rule utilitarianism and indirect utilitarianism, though.) In “The Rights of Animal Persons” I document how utilitarian “animal liberationists” can and do defend medical vivisection, even though that is an affront to animal rights. The feminist ethics of care is based on the intuitions that ethics is based on sympathy, empathy, and/or compassion. However, not only is this ideal intuited, but the way caring is applied is intuited as well. Traditional animal welfarists who still use animals for food, clothing, entertainment, etc. consider themselves compassionate, as do utilitarians who think they “maximize” compassion, whereas those who would abolish all animal exploitation think none could be more compassionate than strong rights advocates. Different intuitive notions of “caring” or compassion therefore compete. Ethical egoism holds that everyone should agree to rules such as not killing, stealing, breaking promises, etc. since it is in everyone’s self-interest to forge such an agreement. It is based on the intuition that people only ought to pursue their own self-interest in the end. Virtue ethics is organized around promoting virtues such as courage, honesty, etc., and avoiding vices such as cruelty, laziness, etc. This last view is based on the intuition that these are the most important or fundamental aspects of ethics. However, every ethical theory also has its own idea as to what is virtuous or vicious: an ethical egoist sees altruism as weak, whereas a utilitarianism sees altruism as noble, for example. So diverse intuitions come to bear against virtue ethics too.

It might be thought odd to claim that the leading rights theories are intuitionist, since only some of them claim to be intuitionist. However, I will illustrate how these other theories are in fact based covertly on intuitions even when they do not claim to be. (Best caring, my own view, is an animal rights theory, but the intention at least is that it not be based on intuitions.) The leading rights views are those based on intuitions, compassion, tradition, Immanuel Kant’s theory, John Rawls’ theory, and Alan Gewirth’s theory. Intutionist rights theories include Tom Regan’s account, elaborated in The Case for Animal Rights (1983), which holds that animals are subjects of a life who have “inherent value,” which means in part that they are not to be treated as a mere means to the ends of others (in contrast to utilitarianism). Martha Nussbaum’s “capabilities approach” is also based on intuitions that individuals have a dignity which (as Rawls says) even the good of society as a whole cannot override. These are self-evidently intuitionist views, but the others evidently are too.

Compassion-based rights (Joan Dunayer bases rights on compassion and justice) are ambiguous, since we have seen, in considering the ethics of care, that people have very different ideas about what caring entails.

Tradition (S. F. Sapontzis and Bernard Rollin rely on this for their version of animal rights) is also amorphous, since traditions exist for virtually every kind of ethical view. So rights based in tradition are intuitively selected among other traditions that do not necessarily involve rights.

Kant posits the ethical principle that forms of action are acceptable if they can be universalized for all moral agents. For example, Kant indicates that we cannot consistently universalize lying, since that would mean that others would lie to us, which we would not find acceptable. Yet we can universalize any ethical principle in theory, so we must find ourselves intuitively favoring some principles over others once again. Julian Franklin extends Kant’s theory to animal rights.

John Rawls asks us to imagine a thought experiment in which we are spirits not yet born, and to frame principles of justice based on the assumption that we do not know if we will be born more or less intelligent, “white” or “black,” rich or poor, etc. He calls this state “the original position.” Therefore, our principles of justice will presumably rule out racism, sexism, classism, and so forth. However, we can frame almost any rules of justice in the original position, so these must be intuitively favored. Also, the original position is rigged so that we will favor strong consideration of individuals. Rawls’ view is based on individualist intuitions rather than utilitarian ones, then. Note that Mark Rowlands and Mark Bernstein use Rawls’ theory of rights to articulate animal rights.

What about the last rights framework, Alan Gewirth’s? He states that we all need freedom and well-being to do anything, so we should claim rights to freedom and well-being. However, this only seems intuitively right to Gewirth, we can surmise, since we can need freedom and well-being without claiming any such rights. Gewirth suggests that we should extend rights to others as well because of the principle of generic consistency. That is, we should treat the same kinds of things in the same ways. However, such a formal principle is compatible with any ethical theory whatsoever, and we are left once again with intuiting which view seems right to us.

Now that we have seen that the ethical scene is apparently intuitionist altogether, what is wrong with relying on intuitions?

First, they free thinkers from the fundamental obligation of justifying one’s views. They are therefore arbitrary, prejudicial, and not fully accountable.

Second, the diversity of intuitions makes ethics totally indeterminate. One cannot truly defend a theory using intuitionism, since it does not fend off any number of other intuited ethical views.

Third, intuitionists cannot resolve conflicts between intuitions without again relying on intuitions, but each will resolve these conflicts differently and along the same lines as what is initially asserted.

There are other problems with intuitionism, but these are certainly a ground-rocking start. Ironically, intuitionism is meant to be used to defend ethical theories. Yet resorting to intuitionism seems to justify skepticism in ethics, or the view that no single view of morality is correct, and people simply offer different assumptions concerning what we ought to do, believe, etc. This is indeed a crisis. The purpose of ethical theory is to justify a view of ethics as correct, and we cannot do this with intuitionism. Animal ethicists are keen to convince others to accept their views, e.g., that we should be vegetarian or vegan in some cases. But we cannot effectively convince others if it is just a case of pitting one set of intuitions against others.

Can we escape the inuition-ridden crisis of justification in ethics? I try to do so with best caring, and how I do so is sketched in “The Rights of Animal Persons,” although I need a forthcoming book to account for this theory in richer detail.