Crisis #1: The Poverty of Justification in (Animal) Ethics: Intuitionism

I am sorry I was not able to keep up my blog in the months since my last entry. I was unavoidably detained by a time-sensitive project of (for me) overwhelming magnitude. Therefore, my last blogging was in the fall, and I now write in the bitter cold of the Canadian winter.

Last time I indicated that animal ethics is in crisis, which is no small claim. The first indicator of crisis status was my observation that most of the ethical theories are intuitionist. What does intuitionism mean? Intuitions are rock-bottom beliefs in ethics, and intuitionists claim that it is neither possible nor necessary to justify intuitions. Because they are rock-bottom or foundational, no reason can be given to justify intuitive beliefs. If another belief is introduced to justify an intuition, then the intuition itself is no longer basic to the system. (Note for specialists: “foundational” here does not necessarily mean that someone is committed to what is called a foundationalist epistemology, only that no more basic belief is given to justify the intuition.)

What are some examples of intuitions? First, let it be noted that thinkers can be either explicit or implicit intuitionists. An explicit intuitionist will discuss their intuitions quite openly. We can interpret someone to be a covert intuitionist, though, if they offer beliefs that are seemingly basic to their system, and no attempt is made to justify the belief, or even to indicate that a justification is needed. We can analyze the leading ethical theories, which have been extended to animal ethics, in terms of intuitions. These theories are: utilitarianism, the feminist ethics of care, ethical egoism, and virtue ethics, and right theories.

Utilitarianism is based on the intuitions that: (1) the good can be analyzed into good = pleasure and bad = pain (or else good = preference-satisfaction and bad = preference-frustration); (2) we ought to maximize the good and minimize the bad overall. (This rough-and-ready sketch does not account for the intuitions of rule utilitarianism and indirect utilitarianism, though.) In “The Rights of Animal Persons” I document how utilitarian “animal liberationists” can and do defend medical vivisection, even though that is an affront to animal rights. The feminist ethics of care is based on the intuitions that ethics is based on sympathy, empathy, and/or compassion. However, not only is this ideal intuited, but the way caring is applied is intuited as well. Traditional animal welfarists who still use animals for food, clothing, entertainment, etc. consider themselves compassionate, as do utilitarians who think they “maximize” compassion, whereas those who would abolish all animal exploitation think none could be more compassionate than strong rights advocates. Different intuitive notions of “caring” or compassion therefore compete. Ethical egoism holds that everyone should agree to rules such as not killing, stealing, breaking promises, etc. since it is in everyone’s self-interest to forge such an agreement. It is based on the intuition that people only ought to pursue their own self-interest in the end. Virtue ethics is organized around promoting virtues such as courage, honesty, etc., and avoiding vices such as cruelty, laziness, etc. This last view is based on the intuition that these are the most important or fundamental aspects of ethics. However, every ethical theory also has its own idea as to what is virtuous or vicious: an ethical egoist sees altruism as weak, whereas a utilitarianism sees altruism as noble, for example. So diverse intuitions come to bear against virtue ethics too.

It might be thought odd to claim that the leading rights theories are intuitionist, since only some of them claim to be intuitionist. However, I will illustrate how these other theories are in fact based covertly on intuitions even when they do not claim to be. (Best caring, my own view, is an animal rights theory, but the intention at least is that it not be based on intuitions.) The leading rights views are those based on intuitions, compassion, tradition, Immanuel Kant’s theory, John Rawls’ theory, and Alan Gewirth’s theory. Intutionist rights theories include Tom Regan’s account, elaborated in The Case for Animal Rights (1983), which holds that animals are subjects of a life who have “inherent value,” which means in part that they are not to be treated as a mere means to the ends of others (in contrast to utilitarianism). Martha Nussbaum’s “capabilities approach” is also based on intuitions that individuals have a dignity which (as Rawls says) even the good of society as a whole cannot override. These are self-evidently intuitionist views, but the others evidently are too.

Compassion-based rights (Joan Dunayer bases rights on compassion and justice) are ambiguous, since we have seen, in considering the ethics of care, that people have very different ideas about what caring entails.

Tradition (S. F. Sapontzis and Bernard Rollin rely on this for their version of animal rights) is also amorphous, since traditions exist for virtually every kind of ethical view. So rights based in tradition are intuitively selected among other traditions that do not necessarily involve rights.

Kant posits the ethical principle that forms of action are acceptable if they can be universalized for all moral agents. For example, Kant indicates that we cannot consistently universalize lying, since that would mean that others would lie to us, which we would not find acceptable. Yet we can universalize any ethical principle in theory, so we must find ourselves intuitively favoring some principles over others once again. Julian Franklin extends Kant’s theory to animal rights.

John Rawls asks us to imagine a thought experiment in which we are spirits not yet born, and to frame principles of justice based on the assumption that we do not know if we will be born more or less intelligent, “white” or “black,” rich or poor, etc. He calls this state “the original position.” Therefore, our principles of justice will presumably rule out racism, sexism, classism, and so forth. However, we can frame almost any rules of justice in the original position, so these must be intuitively favored. Also, the original position is rigged so that we will favor strong consideration of individuals. Rawls’ view is based on individualist intuitions rather than utilitarian ones, then. Note that Mark Rowlands and Mark Bernstein use Rawls’ theory of rights to articulate animal rights.

What about the last rights framework, Alan Gewirth’s? He states that we all need freedom and well-being to do anything, so we should claim rights to freedom and well-being. However, this only seems intuitively right to Gewirth, we can surmise, since we can need freedom and well-being without claiming any such rights. Gewirth suggests that we should extend rights to others as well because of the principle of generic consistency. That is, we should treat the same kinds of things in the same ways. However, such a formal principle is compatible with any ethical theory whatsoever, and we are left once again with intuiting which view seems right to us.

Now that we have seen that the ethical scene is apparently intuitionist altogether, what is wrong with relying on intuitions?

First, they free thinkers from the fundamental obligation of justifying one’s views. They are therefore arbitrary, prejudicial, and not fully accountable.

Second, the diversity of intuitions makes ethics totally indeterminate. One cannot truly defend a theory using intuitionism, since it does not fend off any number of other intuited ethical views.

Third, intuitionists cannot resolve conflicts between intuitions without again relying on intuitions, but each will resolve these conflicts differently and along the same lines as what is initially asserted.

There are other problems with intuitionism, but these are certainly a ground-rocking start. Ironically, intuitionism is meant to be used to defend ethical theories. Yet resorting to intuitionism seems to justify skepticism in ethics, or the view that no single view of morality is correct, and people simply offer different assumptions concerning what we ought to do, believe, etc. This is indeed a crisis. The purpose of ethical theory is to justify a view of ethics as correct, and we cannot do this with intuitionism. Animal ethicists are keen to convince others to accept their views, e.g., that we should be vegetarian or vegan in some cases. But we cannot effectively convince others if it is just a case of pitting one set of intuitions against others.

Can we escape the inuition-ridden crisis of justification in ethics? I try to do so with best caring, and how I do so is sketched in “The Rights of Animal Persons,” although I need a forthcoming book to account for this theory in richer detail.

Contemporary Crises in (Animal) Ethics

Animal ethics is really ethics, in some sense. Any fully articulated theory of animal rights, for example, must not only be an account of our ethical stance towards nonhuman animals. Ideally, it should offer a complete system of ideas pertaining to the ethical treatment of human beings too. When I say “animal ethics” in this series, I really mean “ethics,” and only indicate “animal ethics” to let it be known that I take animals seriously, quite unlike most ethicists in my estimation. In my journal article (available on this website under Academic writing), "The Rights of Animal Persons," I begin to articulate an ethical theory to account for our obligations, etc. towards all kinds of sentient beings. However, I did not compose this theory, or perhaps discover it, because I was complacently adding to a philosophical tradition that had it “all figured out.” On the contrary, contemporary ethics is in the midst of important, far-reaching, and deeply seated crises. Here is a listing of these important crises as I see them, which I attempt to address in my forthcoming book:

1. A crisis of justification in ethics, in the midst of which those who assert moral universals generally rely on variants of intuitionism, and those who deny such universals equally point to intuitionism only in a negative way. Widespread cultural skepticism might lead even noble people to become cynical about moral claims. Intuitions result in a stalemate between different ethical theories. The dead heat cannot be settled intuitively, for that just leads in circles. Yet without resolving the intuitive impasse, skepticism about ethics might well be justified. Tom Regan explicitly depends upon “reflective intuitions” in The Case for Animal Rights. Regan intuits that subjects-of-a-life (who are, roughly speaking, animals who might be the subject of rights, although there is controversy as to whether he means all sentient beings) have equal inherent value, which comes intuitively prepackaged with the idea that they must not be subject to utilitarian consideration. Others, such as Peter Singer, who criticize Regan's explicit intuitionism are what I call “crypto-intuitionists” (those who hide their dependence on intuitions) since Singer relies on his own intuitions. Singer is a utilitarian, and as moral skeptic Bernard Williams points out in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, utilitarianism depends on at least two intuitions: an intuited theory of value, and an intuition that we ought to maximize net utility.
   
2. A crisis in rights theories, such that they do not even logically entail protective rights. I write about this in “The Rights of Animal Persons.” There I show that the leading theories of human rights are so logically vacuous that they permit almost any practical ethic whatsoever, although of course such an outcome is at odds with the intentions of various rights theorists. This shows, in fact, that the leading theories of rights that are not explicitly intuitionist are in fact crypto-intuitionist. Since so many practical commitments are possible on the six most popular rights frameworks, it follows that principles such as strong rights are selected merely intuitively. They certainly do not follow logically from the given frameworks.
   
3. A crisis in animal liberationist ideas of equality, which are either vague or else lead to the untoward conclusion that we should flip a coin about whom to save, a baby or a mosquito. Joan Dunayer is a terrific writer, but she suggests that all sentient beings are equal, period. She recommends generally flipping a coin between a human and a dog, and one gets the impression that she would advise the same with a human or an insect from a close reading of her work. This is what leads a lot of people to reject animal rights as “absurd.” We need a coherent way of deciding such dilemmas that is not simply speciesist. Dunayer opens up a world of wonders describing the mental lives of insects and invertebrates of many sorts. Her writing is marvelous on such points. But I do not think such total equality which extends even to life-saving dilemmas is right or defensible. However, there is a crisis in that no account exists that resolves such conflicts nonarbitrarily or without simplying intuiting our way out of the difficulties, which is no help at all.
   
4. A crisis in anti-vivisection theories heretofore, since they not only do not lead to their avowed conclusion, but sometimes even conduce towards vivisectionism. This can be seen with respect to my showing the rights theories are ambiguous as to logically permitting utilitarianism, the #1 framework for rationalizing vivisection. However, I will show how even principles of the leading rights theories that are explicitly brought to bear on vivisection do not logically rule out this practice and may seem to conduce towards rationalizing it as ethically permissible or even required.
   
5. A crisis in critical moral theory, in which case (a) animal ethics theorists do not foresee logical objections to their own views, and (b) highly objectionable (to my mind) ethical theories are often rebuked, but there is a poverty of convincing refutations—a problem which applies to a whole gamut of such theories. This states of affairs constitutes a crisis since we need not only to assert our own ethical claims convincingly but also to rule out contradictory claims with sufficient reasons. We cannot rule out other views by fiat, or in effect, intuitively or with lame objections and expect to be persuasive in the end.
   
6. A crisis of sectarianism in ethics, in which narrow theories battle against each other, and there is no transcendence to a holistic vision which embodies the advantages but not the disadvantages of the competing theories. In “The Rights of Animal Persons,” I hint how best caring ethics may well have reached this level.
   
7. A lack of a coherent defintion of “speciesism” even among thinkers such as Regan and Singer. Dunayer criticizes their concepts ably, but succumbs to equally major logical problems in her own account;
   
8. A lack of recognition that the traditional concept of “animal welfare” is an oppressive euphemism. This means that the whole debate is not between "animal welfare and animal liberation," but rather, "animal illfare and animal liberation";
   
9. Continuing crises of denying animal minds in whole or in parts (although this trend is definitely on the wane, and a great deal of good work has been accomplished on this score); still much convincing argument can be provided to clinch this area of contention, I believe;
   
10. A crisis of widely asserted incompatibility between deep ecology and animal liberation. I will try to show that such an impasse is neither necessary nor desirable;
    
11. A crisis in religious ethics which casually permit violence towards animals. How can religionists be brought towards animal liberation on their own terms?;
    
12. A crisis in personhood theory in which claims are sometimes made for nonhuman personhood that are at once suggestive and unconvincing;
    
13. A crisis of a lack of refutation of the view, underlying so much of our culture, that I call “superiorism.” I will show that this view is so logically powerful that it can best existing animal liberation theories, and does not succumb to any of the prevailing objections to humanism (which I argue to be speciesism); this is a crisis of total impotence of existing animal liberation theory, as well as underdevelopment perhaps of humanistic theorizing. I am reputed by many to have come up with the strongest version of humanism in ethics, the better to refute it by tackling the strongest rather than weaker versions.
    

I will try to substantiate that these crises exist. I will also show that contemporary theory does not nearly meet them but generally allows them to deepen. We can address these “cultural emergencies” neither with denial nor complacency. Rather, we require sound theoretical provisions. There is also a crisis of global capitalism which undermines ethical commitment everywhere, but I intend to address that in a future work on political economy. Whether or to what extent I meet these listed crises in my forthcoming book is left for the reader to decide. Even if I make progress in addressing only one, that would be significant, although my work is more ambitious than that. However that may be, we cannot simply posit “education” as a solution to these crises. We as a culture need to learn better before we can better teach anyone.

Martin Balluch and Fellow Prisoners Now Free!

Thank you for everyone who lent their support. A judge said that the penalties for the crimes in question are not major enough to warrant continued detention in jail. Dr. Balluch is now going to stand as a member of the Green Party in Austria, and I wish him all the best.

Is It Objectionable to Use the Term "Vivisection"?

Vivisection used to mean “live dissection,” or cutting an animal while still alive. Vivi means “live” and “section” means to cut. Rene Descartes did so without anesthetics. The Oxford Concise Dictionary also defines vivisection as the “painful treatment of living animals for purposes of scientific research.” In other words, the term has expanded in meaning to encompass virtually all harmful or invasive uses of animals in laboratories. Tom Regan, in The Case for Animal Rights, (p. 363) objects to the use of the term vivisection since it means “live dissection.” Later, Regan issued a speech called “The War on Vivisection,” which is linked to from my main page, although he never gave a reason for the switch from disapproving of this term. Perhaps I can give a reason in this blog entry. Do we need to hesitate to use this term, instead opting for the more neutral “animal experimentation”? Not all animal experiments are contrary to the principles of animal liberation, such as experimenting with a poodle to find her optimum diet. Even “invasive animal experiments” is too wordy, and means the same as vivisection. Vivisectionists (those who advocate vivisection; a vivisector is someone who performs vivisection) do not like the term “vivisection” because they consider it inflammatory to associate all of their activities with the root meaning of live dissection. However, not only do vivisectors sometimes do live dissections, but they are proposing that this word be dismissed because it departs from its root meaning, set out above. Yet if we upheld this practice in general, we would need to jettison the word “capital” because it originally referred to heads of cattle (cap means “head” in this context). Perhaps the vivisectionists are embarrassed that the term has come to be associated with pain, or more inclusively, we might say suffering or harm. That is too bad. The experiments in question inherently cause harm. Even animals being regularly deprived of fresh air, sunlight, natural surroundings, decent food, friendship or love, amusements, exercise, as well as safety are due to laboratory confinement. This is literal harm, not just a metaphor. Additionally, animals are subject to surgery without anesthetics, drowning, cramping, crowding, freezing, burning, crushing, car-crashing, starvation, induced aggression or passivity, compression, irradiation, weapons targeting, disease infections, and so much more. That is vivisection in the proper dictionary sense. Requests that we pussy-foot around so as not to injure vivisectionists’ delicate feelings would be a form of speciesist repression, and a valorization of ignoring the suffering of animals just to make things pleasant for humans. There is no good reason, I conclude, to abstain from the use of the term “vivisection” and associated terms, although I would argue that there are any number of excellent reasons to abstain from vivisection itself. Let vivisectors be held accountable for the harms they cause, including through the deliberate use of appropriate terminology.

My first two entries in my Animal Ethics series have been about the appropriate use of terms. I will now launch into more theoretical questions. Next entry will be: are we facing a crisis in animal ethics?

Work Cited

Regan, Tom. 1983. The Case for Animal Rights. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Is It Speciesist to Use the Term "Animal"?

Tom Regan nobly uses the term “NHA” as an abbreviation for “nonhuman animal” in his book, Empty Cages. After all, there are human and nonhuman animals, and we are all animals. By using “animal” in opposition to “humans,” some take that to imply that humans are after all not animals. An alarming number of religious fundamentalists actually believe that we are not animals. Now I would find it tedious to say “nonhuman animals” over and over again, and while Regan is savvy to use “NHA,” I do not think there is any universal obligation to use that abbreviation. Should we always speak of "NHA rights" when we mean "animal rights"? Someone might think I was referring to rights associated with the National Hockey Association (1909-1917), the forerunner of the National Hockey League. There are different acceptable stylistic choices available. In my own writing and speaking, although I am aware of the obnoxiousness of those who can witness that we are full of animal structures and functions who yet deny our animality, I sometimes use the term “animal” to mean “nonhuman animals.”

Now Joan Dunayer, who has done first-rate work on animal liberation language-usage in her book, Animal Equality: Language and Liberation, and who in my opinion does perhaps the best writing on the mental lives of insects, mollusks, and others, maintains in her book Speciesism that it is speciesist to use “animal” as I am wont to do (unless I say "nonhuman" emphatically of course). She objects that saying “humans and animals” is logically the same as saying “blacks and humans.” (Dunayer 2004, 12) I agree that someone using the latter phrase is assuming that blacks are somehow (I know not how!) not human. However, thanks to standard usage, someone who uses the word “animals” to refer to nonhuman animals does not imply that humans are not animals. In the case of such an utterance, anyone who is competent in the life sciences will speak and listen with the understanding that humans are animals too.

Dunayer would have us say “nonhuman rights” instead of “animal rights.” Yet “nonhuman” applies to stones and saucepans, and it also seeks to encompass animals with an ironically human-centred term: nonhuman. It can be construed as anthropocentric to require all uses of “animal” to be prefaced with a reference to humanity or non-humanity, as the case may be. It can be viewed as a celebration of animality independent of “us” to refer to animals without any reference to humans whatsoever. That is in a certain respect a more nonanthropocentric usage.

The short-form “animal” is defensible theoretically since its meaning will be well-understood, if it is otherwise stated or implied that humans are animals too. It would also be unwise to leap to the conclusion that a speaker who says "animal" must mean that humans are better than other animals. In general, I agree with the broader intellectual tradition that it is wise to employ the principle referred to as "charity of interpretation." That means interpreting what others say in a favorable way, or the way that they intend, unless there is a good reason to do otherwise. Certainly I can find no theoretical or practical reason to do otherwise. I have already addressed the theory part.

Practically, “animal” is acceptable in terms of animal advocacy. I reason this by answering some relevant questions in this context. Will using “animal” make anti-speciesists treat animals any worse? No. Will the word usage make speciesists treat animals worse? No. Will the word make speciesists less likely to be “converted” by anti-speciesists? I doubt it. Who has ever resisted “animal rights” just because they were not called “nonhuman animal rights” or “nonhuman rights,” as Dunayer would have it (and as advocates for the rights of stones would have it too, I suppose). Nobody dismisses “animal rights” because one stylistically awkward phrase or another is avoided. Therefore, there is no oppressive implication that humans are “above” animality, and the term “animal” can be defended both theoretically and practically.

It is a commonplace, and my friend JoAnne Schwab reminds me, that the way we use language affects how we think. However, I do not think seriously that deniers that humans are animals will ever change their views just because I use the term "nonhuman," let alone will anyone who agrees that humans are animals change their mind over word usage. It might help people who deny human animality though by reminding them and getting them to think about the matter. That is why this debate is not all-or-nothing. I concede there is merit in sometimes emphasizing, one way or another, that humans are animals too. I am just denying that it is oppressive to use the term "animal." It is more of a stylistic and practical consideration I suppose.

In her zeal to label people such as myself “new speciesists,” (I am in good company here along with Tom Regan, Evelyn Pluhar and others) I do not think that Dunayer, in this particular case, reflects lucidly on traditional usage. It is a pity, since much of her work on language is inspired. For example, she says we should call animals (or in her usage "nonhumans") who live with us "animal companions" rather than "companion animals," since the latter phrase implies it is the human or perhaps divine purpose of animals to serve as our companions. Her own rephrasing carries no such implication. Still, in the case of "animal," I say it is a case of revisionism that itself stands in need of revision.

Works Cited

Dunayer, Joan. 2001. Animal Equality: Language and Liberation. Derwood: Ryce Publishing.

Dunayer, Joan. 2004. Speciesism. Derwood: Ryce Publishing.

New Series on Animal Ethics

Believe it or not, I have said all I want to for now concerning the animal rights pragmatism versus fundamentalism debate (on whether animal "welfare" laws are permissible, or even important, for the animal rights movement). I have written a lot about Francione's ideas on this score since he has a lot to say about the topic. I think this might have been the most urgent topic to discuss for the animal rights movement, since the outcome of the debate may determine what actions animal rights activists might take. There are some Francione followers who read my essay, "Animal Rights Law," and switched over to following the lead of my ideas on animal pragmatism, and they also desire to promote my blog which contains important additional insights not found in the essay just noted. I am pleased that I ended that series with a meditation on what is positive in Francione's approach, in keeping with my orientation towards being balanced and strictly issues-oriented concerning what he has to say.

Many other questions of animal ethics tend to be more academic. They are very important, but they are most often not apt to alter the behaviour of animal rights activists. However, theory is still vital for settling practical questions. In "The Rights of Animal Persons," I note how past theories of animal rights do not logically entail antivivisection. My own theory, I argue, does, and that is significant. I will comment in more detail in the Animal Ethics series how past theories do not logically rule out vivisection, since there are many different aspects of this problem.

While some people may be won over by reading philosophical arguments, it is not clear to me how large a percentage of society this amounts to. We should not underestimate in this respect though. We can list considerations which should cause us to conclude that so-called "animal ethics" matters a great deal:

1. Whether philosophizing should take place is in many ways independent of how often it happens to occur in the world at this time. That something is uncommon does not imply that it is without value. People ought to cultivate philosophy that they may choose more wisely, and hopefully not be dogmatic in what they believe but rather justified. That is not easy to do, but it is essential to being accountable. Perhaps one far-flung day adults who are unable to fully reason about their ethical principles will not be regarded as fully mature. That cannot be the case today, however, since supposedly the best theories on offer cannot thoroughly be rationally defended, in my view.
   
2. I myself have convinced people using arguments in favour of animal rights.
   
3. Testing one's view for rational adequacy helps one to be accountable to oneself, to either shore up one's beliefs or indicate an area of thought that needs to be developed. The process of reasoning could well even cause one to modify one's stance, either to a greater or lesser degree.
   
4. People read books on the subject to intelligently decide their stance on such matters
   
5. University students take courses studying such material
   
6. The leaders of society, politicians, lawmakers, lawyers and the judiciary, sometimes look to academic theories to ground their approaches, and then the practical reflection of what they believe may emerge in the rest of society
   
7. As society makes progress in the area of animal suffering-reduction, the next phase of progress will have to be more philosophical; there will be no more atrocity images to show since the blatant cruelties will have been taken care of and we will be left with forms of animal slavery that need to be debated on more philosophical grounds
   
8. Animal ethics are already debated to some extent in academics
   
9. I predict that if all goes well, ethics education will one day find itself into mandatory schooling for everyone in society; in both of the latter two contexts, one real and the other still only imaginary, winning arguments are priceless.
   

Winning arguments, ultimately, is what I aim to achieve. Whether I attain that in any given case is up to each person to decide for himself/herself.

My series on animal ethics will examine animal rights theories, and also theories that compete with animal rights. Believe it or not, I have not yet commented on Francione's animal rights theory (with the exception of his views on "unnecessary suffering"). I have only addressed his arguments on animal activism. However, we have had an abundance of Francione lately so I will turn now to other animal theorists, such as Tom Regan, Evelyn B. Pluhar (as her name appears on her important book; her surname is now Pluhar-Adams), Paola Cavalieri, Julian Franklin, Bernard Rollin, Steve Sapontzis, Mark Rowlands, Mark Berstein, and others. Eventually, I will get to Francione's own theory of animal rights. All in good time. I will illuminate my perception that animal rights theory is in a state of crisis. I have already argued this in "The Rights of Animal Persons" in a manner that many people have found to be right and even refreshing. There I argue that astonishingly enough, current theories of animal rights do not even logically entail rights in any strong form. However, while the article contains other, more specific criticisms of the theories of animal liberation, it could by no means be comprehensive. I will highlight what in other theories seems to me right or positive, while also criticizing in a way that recognizes problems. I will not be able to vindicate what I regard as right though without my own theory of morality, called "best caring ethics." (BCE) This is introduced in my published article (accessible on this website) called "The Rights of Animal Persons," and I will make some reference to that essay. The forthcoming series of blog entries will highlight why I think we need a book defending BCE at a length that permits much more depth and thoroughness. My book is on the way but still needs time before it greets the public.

Negativism in Francione, and Avoiding Negativism towards Francione

I find that much of what Francione suggests or advocates is strikingly negative in character or orientation. Consider:

1. Francione at times in his Introduction to Animal Rights argues in favor of one right for animals—not to be considered property (Francione 2000, xxxiv). At times he says, more consistently, that it is the basis of all other animal rights. (Ibid., xxviii) This is at base a right to something negative rather than expressing a positive vision. It therefore leaves anything positive to the dice of fate.
   
2. Francione tries to negate animal rights pragmatism as “new welfarism,” denying that such pragmatists are genuine animal rights abolitionists, although we have seen that he himself hypocritically buys into speciesist “proto-rights” outcomes
   
3. He negatively construes the majority of the public as being like the sadistic psychopath Jeffrey Dahmer since they eat meat, and obscenely portrays PETA supporters as “petaphiles”
   
4. He is immovable in his pessimism that “welfarist” laws only allows animals to be exploited more profitably, even after this idea is utterly disproven
   
5. He is sweepingly negative in his assessment of progress that has been won for animals thus far
   
6. He seeks to negate animal rights in the form of garbaging his former advocacy of the Great Ape Project
   
7. He only views, say, lacto-ovo vegetarians negatively, rather than having anything positive to say about what they accomplish
   

Of negativism what good will come? This is not to say that some things should not be negated though. I have tried to refute erroneous statements and illogical arguments in Francione’s work.

Sometimes advocates of Francione are biased in being mesmerized by certain positive aspects of his ideas, while conveniently ignoring many dire considerations associated with what he claims. Yet we must also avoid a biased account of Francione, or one that is unduly negative. I would like to conclude, therefore, with a recognition of what is positive in Francione’s professions:

1. He advocates veganism
   
2. He is assertive about animal rights, unlike some believers in that ideal
   
3. He does not wish to see justice compromised by commercialism, as it so often is in human affairs too
   
4. He tries to promote a rational vision of equality in the form of what he calls “the principle of equal consideration”
   
5. He recognizes that his “proto-rights” proposals are not perfect but instead “tries to approximate an idea in a sensible way”
   
6. He uses arguments to try to deflate speciesism
   
7. He tries to find the most efficient way of promoting animal rights that is most consistent with his perception of ethics
   
8. He strives to avoid outcomes that will conduce towards complacency and increased animal consumption
   
9. He has pioneered in the field of animal law
   
10. He contributes much education through his scholarship, informal writing, university teaching, talks for the public, and internet activism
    
11. He acknowledges that some attempts to promote animal welfare are fine, such as helping individual animals, and in general agrees that it is wise to avoid “unnecessary suffering” in a demanding, abolitionist construal of these terms
    
12. He tries to put forward an original theory of animal rights and animal law
    

Surely there is much that I have omitted regarding both his negativism and positive contributions. Certainly this is not intended as an attempt to weigh pros and cons of subscribing to his approach. Much of what is positive is just his efforts to realize animal rights with integrity. I have refuted that he is most effective in vegan advocacy, negating complacency and animal consumption, putting forward coherent theory, and a great deal more. However, intentions and efforts matter. For all their possible folly, they remain partial indications of character.

FURTHER READING ON ANIMAL RIGHTS INCREMENTALISM

A Selection of Related Articles

Sztybel, David. "Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism". Journal for Critical Animal Studies 5 (1) (2007): 1-37.

go there

Short version of "Animal Rights Law".

go there

Sztybel, David. "Incrementalist Animal Law: Welcome to the Real World".

go there

Sztybel, David. "Sztybelian Pragmatism versus Francionist Pseudo-Pragmatism".

go there

A Selection of Related Blog Entries

Anti-Cruelty Laws and Non-Violent Approximation

Use Not Treatment: Francione’s Cracked Nutshell

Francione Flees Debate with Me Again, Runs into the “Animal Jury”

The False Dilemma: Veganizing versus Legalizing

Veganism as a Baseline for Animal Rights: Two Different Senses

Francione's Three Feeble Critiques of My Views

Startling Decline in Meat Consumption Proves Francionists Are Wrong Once Again!

The Greatness of the Great Ape Project under Attack!

Francione Totally Misinterprets Singer

Francione's Animal Rights Theory

Francione on Unnecessary Suffering

My Appearance on AR Zone

D-Day for Francionists

Sztybel versus Francione on Animals' Property Status

The Red Carpet

Playing into the Hands of Animal Exploiters

The Abolitionist ApproachES

Francione's Mighty Boomerang

Dr. David Sztybel Home Page